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INTRODUCTION

On

February

1758, the entire

3,

Massachusetts deserted their posts
initiated

Learned,

at

company of Captain Ebenezer Learned from

a fort in Stillwater,

by the men of the company but was

who had

led

by

men

discouraged and demoralized.

commander of the

the British

York. This desertion was

commander, Captain Ebenezer

their

returned from a furlough to find his

They had received orders from

New

garrison, Captain Philip

Skene, that they would have to remain on guard through the winter
enlistments, however,

to have his

company

were due

to expire

on February

at Stillwater.

Their

1758. Their captain attempted

2,

released but Skene refused to bend.

From

the British perspective,

the colonial force had been recruited to protect the colonies from the French and those

enemy

forces remained a threat. After discussing the

men, Captain Learned directed
of snow

until

his

men

to

commander's decision with

make snow shoes and

reach Deerfield, Massachusetts, the

men

south.

company was

During the seven days

lost for

suffered from frostbite and hunger. Finally, one of the

Knowing

that

some of the

own and that the

built a fire

rest

men

The

deserters

help.

took to

realized that the creek they

his

men

to trust

him one

last

would not make the remainder of the march on

of his company had not the strength to

and went ahead for

welcoming arms by the

injured

it

fort,

two days and many men

were following was near Deerfield. Captain Learned asked

their

hide them within banks

they could escape. The provincial officer led his company out of the

under the cover of darkness, marching his

time.

his

When

help, the

commander

he arrived, Learned was greeted with

soldiers there and a relief column

was

were greeted with a hero's welcome, allowed

1

sent back for the others.

to recover

from

their ordeal,

and sent home. The captain never

commander.

left his

men and

the soldiers never lost faith in their

1

Why would a military officer agree to lead a desertion? And why would
trust

he would

listen to their

War? Was he simply

And why would

a

men

his

problems and not punish them under the British Articles of

coward or did

his decision reflect

the receiving garrison help

something different entirely?

them upon their

arrival?

I

believe this

an

is

extreme example of the new form of leadership that was developed under the provincial
system of military. The provincial armies comprised voluntary enlistments of men

were family,

friend and neighbor

armies required a

who worked

new form of leadership

that

who

together in an egalitarian society. These

engendered

trust necessary to

continued support within local communities. Without that

trust,

new

promote

enlistments could

not be counted on for future campaigns.

In

how the

A

People 'sArmy at War, Fred Anderson goes a long way towards explaining

colonial forces of

their British counterparts

New England in the eighteenth century were different from

and

how those

differences helped precipitate a later conflict, the

American War of Independence. Anderson plausibly contends

that

New England's

with English social
cultural values, reflected in their military institution, clashed

norms

in

Years' War, resulting in a realization
the interactions between soldiers during the Seven

that colonials

were no longer "English" but were "American". While

a social angle
questioning the interpretation of military history from

fruitful,

i

Anderson

fails to

adequately examine

how the

relationships

his

is

method of

compelling and

between

officers and

(Boston: Houton Mifflin, 1903), p. 11.
Rafos Pataaiii M.mnirsnf Rufus Putnam,
Carolma Press. 1984).
(Chapel Hill. The University of North

FreHnderson. A^ep^e^Army.

2

p.

162-4.

men, developed

in

an egalitarian society and a voluntary army, became a unique form of

leadership negotiated in a singular manner.

Fred Anderson understands the relationship between officers and their men,

in

Massachusetts, to be a contractual arrangement that was mainly legalistic and economic
in nature.

This insight explains

soldiers and English soldiers.

maintenance of unit cohesion

New

much about

the differences between the Massachusetts

Yet contract as a concept explains

little

that repeatedly survived the anguish

about the

of battle experience.

England units did not dissolve upon contact with the enemy, including

assaults in the

most violent

situations.

from the Bay Colony and the
throughout the

first

rest

direct

Pay and a contract cannot explain how regiments

of New England could succeed time and again

half of the eighteenth century against professional soldiers, nor

why

England units performed well, when given a chance, against professional armies

New

the French and Indian War, despite the conclusions of other recent historians.

regard,

it is

more

useful to focus

on the relationship between the provincial

in

In this

officers

and

their subordinates.

The voluntary
into battle with

lead
soldiers of the provincial armies trusted their officers to

common

sense and loyalty found

in

them

a unique relationship that

to meet battlefield
incorporated the values of their society, sufficiently changed

conditions.

rely

on

their

soldiers.

Massachusetts could not
Unlike most English commanders, the officers of

honor and a draconian system of discipline

Instead, they led

to force obedience

by exemplifying courage, common

See

They were expected

Warfare in the Colonial
the Wilderness: The Triumph of European
University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).

Guy Chefs Conquering

Northeast, (Amherst:

their

sense, and religious

effective loyalty of their men.
fortitude and thereby maintaining the

2

from

to uphold the contractual obligations of provincial enlistments while enforcing "fair"

discipline against transgressors. Furthermore,

the tactical

when
This

norms developed

it

was expected

in the colonies, attacking

that they

would adhere

to

when advantageous, defending

necessary, but always keeping the welfare of their soldiers foremost in their minds.

tacit

code of military etiquette created a relationship between

totally foreign to the professional

army of England. Rather than

officers

rely

and men

on a complete

separation between classes to create effectiveness on the battlefield, the colonial forces

succeeded by maintaining a sense of social equality viewed as dishonorable by
British counterparts.

4

their

CHAPTER ONE
THE BRITISH OFFICER

Social institutions tend to reflect the cultural values of that society because they
are products of that culture.

Though

in this regard.

The

British

Army of the

eighteenth century

was no

different

the specific workings of the military conformed to outside

influences, such as tactics and technology, the overarching professional ethos reflected

British society as a whole. In war, hierarchy and discipline are necessary to accomplish

victory in the face of immanent death.

The

British version of this took the

form of

exaggerated separation of classes and extreme punishment. Though as much as one-third

of the junior officers came from the ranks (who, without money or patronage,

overwhelmingly remained junior)
officer corps, soldiers

came from

,

the British aristocracy and

its

ethos dominated the

the working class and were enlisted for

offenses against the British Articles of War were punishable by death,

were punishable

much

in 1645.

With the advent of a

series

as crimes

rectify their military mission with the Will

New Model

of defeats for the Parliamentary

forces early in the English Civil War, Puritans in the

need to

House of Commons perceived

A new sense of "self-denial" was necessary,

God's favor renewed and they began

a

of God. Previously, members of

Parliament could simultaneously serve as officers in the army and have a seat

government.

and most

in civil society.

The Imperial army of the eighteenth century was a product of the
Army, created

life,

in

they thought, to bring them

to call for a separation of civil and military

Provincial Soldier on the Northern Frontier,
Steven Charles Eames, Rustic Warriors: Warfare and the
335-6.
1689-1748, (University of New Hampshire: UMI, 1989), p.

3

5

authority.

battle

Parliament was the place for debate over military strategy, not on the

between commanders. This new vision alarmed many

feared further restrictions on aristocratic

power and

in the

A

privilege.

Though

this

new

compromise was
bill

was

4

institution

growing concept of democracy,
authority, Oliver

in

would seem,

which

Cromwell's tenure as

to

military

modern

eyes, to

fit

well with a

power was subordinate

dictator did

much

to civil

to sour English public opinion

regards to a standing army. For five years, from 1653 to 1658, Cromwell ruled over

in

England as a

dictator, using the

his rule over both the

naming

his

Rump

New Model Army to establish

Parliament and English society.

son as successor, Cromwell's army

Parliament was unable to afford
After

encamped

fell

his control

Upon

and to enforce

his death, despite

into disarray largely because

5

its

payroll.

many months of instability, General George Monck marched on London

1660 from Scotland with

his unit, the

Coldstream Guards to re-establish order.

his soldiers outside the gates

of the

city

demanding

that the

Rump

Once

it

was

clear that those

to the authority

Mark

p.

demands would be met, Monck submitted

of the newly elected Parliament

A. Kishlanski, The Rise of the

New Model Army,

Parliament

II.

his military

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979),

The Birth of the British Army (1660-1690),
Noel T. St. John Williams, Redcoats and Courtesans:
(London: Brassey's Ltd., 1994), p. 3-4.
6

Ibid., p. 5-8.

6

power

6

28-40.

5

in

He

be dissolved, called for free elections, and openly supported the return of Charles

4

of

House of Lords who

reached whereby both Houses were needed to approve commissions and the
passed on February 17, 1645.

field

Within a year,

new

in

February of 1661, the

British military institution

under the

was formally

command of General Monck.

New Model Army was

name of the king and

established, in the

This

new

institution

disbanded and the

was

still

subject to

Parliamentary control because funding had to be voted upon and given by the House of

Commons,
new

but the commissioning of the officers

laws, the English

came

army was an expansion of the

directly

traditional

from medieval Europe. Though the king no longer had to
their

own

units to support his

war aims, the army was

still

call

By

King's Guard concept

upon vassals

to supply

viewed as an extension of the

king's authority and, until the end of King James II's reign,

allowances.

from the king. Under the

the late seventeenth century, however, the

was paid

for out of the royal

army had grown

to over

34,000 soldiers and their salaries began to be paid for out of the Parliamentary funding
for county militias,

which were

practical to the defense of a

The

British

still

dear to

many an Englishman's

growing empire.

heart but

no longer

7

army was bom during a period of the

tensions between monarch and

Parliament, aristocracy and bourgeoisie, Anglican and Puritan cultural values.

ground was found, though, which balanced a
found

in

fear

Common

of monarchical authority and abuse

protect imperial
Europe's standing army tradition and the needs to grow and

power abroad. County

militias

were perceived by the growing

British gentry as a

impractical for the projection of power in
salutary restraint to absolutism in England, if

defense
British colonies. This faith in militias for local
8

American colonies during

7

8

Ibid., p. 22-5, 45,

this time.

219-20.

Ibid., p. 22-5.

7

was exported

to the

North

As

stated above, the king

was responsible

accomplished through the purchase system
until

1

The purchase system enforced

870.

aristocrats

for

commissioning

This

officers.

British officers purchased their

the social requirement that

all

was

commissions

officers be

of either wealthy means or noble patronage or the sons of rich merchants who

could afford their commission. Officers were not paid well and promotions were not

determined by experience or merit, but were purchased from a superior officer

of his retirement or

own

his

promotion.

To

wealth or patronage from his supporters
the reign of Queen Anne,
10

selling his

it

meant

commission

rank an officer needed either inherited

The system was open

was not unknown

time

for high

to serious abuse.

Prior to

commissions to be purchased

for

This was deemed beneficial both by the monarch and the

nobility at their birth.

Parliament because

it

rise in

at the

that

that the officer

was

in

charge of his retirement.

It

was by

an officer was able to leave the service and maintain himself

as a civilian.

The
insisted

British system

upon the

to honor.

nobility

Among

of patronage and purchase within the

and wealth of its members,

officer-gentlemen, dueling

send two officers into a

field,

it

officer corps not only

also inculcated primary adherence

was common

The

smallest slight could

each with his "second" to prepare weapons and possible

their family or regiment's honor.
funeral arrangements, to fight with sword or pistol for

Though
were

9

administration of the army, they
these contests were publicly denounced by the

difficult to obstruct

http://www.sa Qdhursl

10

A.J. Barker,

mod

.

when even

generals were guilty of the infraction, as was the

uk/history/i ndcx hi

m

Red Coals (London: Gordon Crcmoncsi,
,

8

Ltd.. 1976), p.

case with Generals William

Howe

and Thomas Gates

in 1778, during the

11

Revolution.

In relationship to their soldiers, British officers

them

loyalty to king, country, and regiment.

from authority

that

army came from
were used

American

had

its

An

were charged with inculcating

officer's ability to lead his troops

foundations in several areas.

Common

by

tradition, so

came

soldiers in the British

a society highly stratified and hierarchically rigid.

to obedience towards the aristocracy

in

Lower

men

class

an officer's social rank

reinforced his authority over his soldiers. All soldiers in a regiment were placed in the
position of total dependency on their regimental commanders. Parliament had enacted a

pay and clothing system that placed the regimental commander
financial and physical well-being.

The commander received

all

in

charge of the soldiers'

allowances, clothing,

food, and pay for his men. His paymaster and quartermaster were then charged with the
disbursal of funds and support

among the
well.

their

by which the soldiers

lived.

This created dependency

officers as
soldiers, not just for their institution (ie. the regiment) but for their

Finally, military

men, on the

field

honor demanded

that officers place themselves in danger, with

of battle. Though they were encouraged to indoctrinate

with draconian discipline to enforce order

in

their

men

combat, the example of the officer's courage
12

gave him a moral authority over his
If honor

and courage were the foundations of officer

structure through

soldiers.

11

men that they would be willing to

which the

Discipline

officer corps attained success

was understood

to

mean the

follow.

authority, discipline

on the

was

the

battlefield with their

difference between victory and defeat in

Ibid., p. 28.

in the Revolutionary
America: A Social History ofMilitary Life
Sylvia R. Frey, The British Soldier in
132.
Period, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), p.
1

9

combat. Soldiers were required to stand
artillery

and musket

balls

every thirty seconds.

in

formation and face a brutal onslaught of

while firing and reloading their muskets

And

if

they

managed

to survive the

first

at the rate

of once

minutes of this

terror,

they

could expect to face a cavalry charge on their flanks by the enemy's heavy horse. The
training to

make men capable of such

similarly brutal and born

The

tacticians

actions in the face of certain

from the changing

maiming or death was

and technology of the day.

tactics

of early modern warfare were attempting to keep up with the

European

advancing technology of the eighteenth century

tactics in the seventeenth

century relied upon four main types of units. Artillery had become lighter and was no
longer relegated to use solely in fortifications or

field

took the

and decimated infantry formations with cannon balls and grapeshot. The infantry

was composed of two

different formations.

that required forks for support and

To

at sea. Instead, artillery batteries

Musketeers carried heavy matchlock muskets

were unwieldy

in

maneuver but deadly

in firepower.

pikeman,
protect these musketeers against cavalry, the second type of infantry, the

was used
pike, to

in phalanx-like formations.

keep

unit, the

fast

Pikemen wore armor and wielded a long

moving dragoons, or heavy

mounted dragoon, was

cavalry, at bay.

utilized for flanking

enemy's infantry and to drive them from the

The

spear, or

fourth main combat

maneuvers to overwhelm the

field.

changed this
Eighteenth-century technological innovation fundamentally
1690's by the flintlock musket, in
paradigm. The heavy matchlocks were replaced in the
the British army, and those

"Brown

13

Bess".

were standardized

in

1

730 by the Long Pattern Musket, or

Musketeers did not wear armor and the

flintlock, a lighter

H. Herwig, and Timothy
Christopher L Archer, John R. Ferris, Holger
2002), p. 322.
Warfare, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska,

13

10

H E. Travers,

and more

World History of

maneuverable weapon, allowed infantrymen to be more mobile on the

Another innovation, the

ball

battlefield.

and socket bayonet, removed the need for pikemen as

protection against cavalry and they were retired from service in 1704. Instead,

infantrymen became musketeers with the

ability to shoot their

defend themselves from other units on the

somewhat with
accurate

the

move and

Their rate of fire increased

battlefield.

the introduction of prepared cartridges but their ability to produce

was

fire

weapon on

all

sacrificed for a higher rate of

fire.

It

has been estimated that a flintlock

using paper cartridges could be discharged twice a minute which doubled the rate of fire

compared

to a matchlock musket. Flintlocks had a misfire rate of about

matchlocks

1

out of 2

14
.

which seriously compromised accuracy.

aim and think under

fire,

was

that

accuracy was not significant.

15

the barrel

when

men

to

the prerogative of the officer, and so the sacrifice of

For this reason, volley

by platoon, creating a

fire,

or firing muskets in unison

in

ranks and

commanded

rolling fire, in order to increase the overall rate of fire

of the formation. Draconian discipline was required for
face of enemy

down

British officers did not trust their

and on command, was deemed necessary. Soldiers were placed
to volley fire

out of 3;

Soldiers used balls smaller than the bore of their muzzles in

order to ease reloading despite the resultant tumbling of the ball

fired

1

this drill to

be performed

in the

16

fire.

British soldiers accepted their brutal training out of the necessities of large-scale

the
warfare and because of cultural mores. Non-commissioned officers understood

of ingrained

drilling for success

14

David Chandler, The Art of War

15

Hans

Delbriick, The

16

Ibid., p.

on the European

in the

Dawn ofModern

battlefield,

Age of Marlborough,

where unlimited war had

(Staplehurst, England, 1990), 75-79.

Warfare, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1985),

269-71.

11

utility

p.

269-71.

become

the military norm.

And

punishment was well established.
privates, while

still

in

use of corporal and capital

in British society, the legal

Still,

the

summary use of the cane

to discipline

use through the eighteenth century, was becoming less permissible.

Personal violence by officers against their

men was

replaced late in the seventeenth

century by the regimental and general court-martial system, codified in 1685 in the
Articles of War. Regimental courts-martial heard corporal crimes and general courts-

martial

were convened

system

lent

more

in capital cases.

While

more

this

rational

and

protection to eighteenth century soldiers, flogging

sentences of a thousand lashes was normal. In

fact,

less arbitrary legal

was common and

flogging as a form of disciplinary
1

punishment

in the British

army was not formally abolished

until 1881.

Fred Anderson describes the British disciplinary system as one of "justice,

and mercy".

19

The law was an

entity

of its own, an impartial

stricture that applied to

every man, regardless of status. Punishment for an infraction was swift and
often death.

Once

the sentence had been passed, the

gallows or the flogging post,

But

his fate could

be averted,

in front

at

terror,

condemned was

terrible,

led to either the

of the entire regiment, and his sentence was read.

the last

moment, by mercy. The commander of the

reduce the punishment,
regiment, as the representative of the crown, had the authority to
or pardon the soldier altogether.

As

such, military tribunals

became

a sort of tragic

underdog, his fate indeterminate unt
morality play, with the accused soldier as the moral
his commander.
the final minute, and hinged upon the word of

,7

18

Frey, p. 80-1.

Ibid., p. 93.

19

Anderson, A People 'sArmy, p.121.

20

Ibid., p. 121-3.

12

20

By the time

of British military intervention

in the

American colonies

in 1755, a

system of social hierarchy, honor, and discipline was well established within the
institution

of the "Redcoats". Though successful in the European

theater,

and similar to

other like institutions on the Continent, the British military could not have been more
dissimilar to the military institution that had evolved in the British colonies for the last

century and a

half, especially in

New England,

under the military objectives of limited

warfare, the petite guerre. At the onset of the Seven Years'

difference

would prove disastrous

difficulties that

him by

his patron, the

command of His Majesty's
two regiments from

in the colonies in

February 1755,

awaited him which arose from the differences

between North American colonial society and Great
authority granted

in the colonies, this

for the professional British establishment.

When Major General Edward Braddock arrived
he was unprepared for the

War

Britain.

Braddock

Duke of Cumberland,

to

arrived with the

assume overall

forces in British America. While awaiting the arrival of his

Ireland, the

44

the colonial governors in April to

th

and 48

tell

th

Foot, Braddock

them of London's plan

demanded a meeting with
for

campaigns that

year.

He

push the French from
explained that four separate expeditions were planned in order to
in hopes of confining her to the
the Ohio Valley and off of the shores of the Great Lakes,

northern reaches of the

St.

Lawrence.

regiments and attack Fort
General Braddock would head west with his two

Duquesne
to

in the

Ohio Valley. Simultaneously, William

Shirley,

who had been promoted

behind Braddock, would
Major General and placed second-in-command

lead an

would rendezvous with Braddock's victorious
expedition to seize Fort Niagara, where he
of
William Johnson was to be placed in charge
troops coming north from Fort Duquesne.

13

a third expedition to seize Fort

fourth expedition

moved by

St.

Frederic at

Point on Lake Chaplain, while a

sea north from Boston to attack

Governor Shirley complained

Scotia.

Crown

that this plan

two French

forts

on Nova

was too ambitious and should be

scaled down, as did the other governors, and he suggested that Duquesne be attacked

after

Niagara was occupied. The outpost

relied

upon Fort Niagara

and would be more easily destroyed as a secondary

Edward Braddock had

target.

not attained his vaunted position through battlefield

experience. Instead, Cumberland had promoted Braddock for

Braddock was an excellent

for supplies and troops

two other

administrator, a quality he had illustrated

reasons. First,

when

placed in

charge of the garrison and colony of Minorca. Second, he followed orders to the

and demanded that
plan set in

do the same. Braddock' s orders were

to follow the

force the colonists to support him in that endeavor.

He ignored

his subordinates

London and

letter

colonial advice and dismissed the governors with

demands

that they raise the required

supplies necessary
provincial troops and supply the English regiments with quarters and

for the

upcoming campaigns.

21

When Braddock marched west to his destiny,

he made several decisions that were

might not have proved so costly.
not unexpected, decisions which in another theater
First,

need Indian
according to Fred Anderson, he decided that he did not

after the

newly appointed Indian agent

several hundred Shawnee, Delaware,

for the South,

allies.

George Croghan, managed

Mingo, and other

tribal

In fact,

to gather

warriors Braddock

managed to drive the French from the
proceeded to assure them that once the British had
Ohio Valley they would ensure

that

land
no Indians would be allowed to use the

Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire
Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The
Faber, Inc., 2000), p. 86-88.
America, 1754-1766, (London: Faber &
21
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in British

for

North

themselves.

Not

surprisingly, only seven

guides on the expedition.

Mingo

warriors were convinced to help as

Second, Braddock made

it

known

that colonial soldiers

were

next to useless because of their lack of discipline. Although he had them drilled over the
three

weeks before they began

their march,

he trusted only the 44

ignoring the flexibility irregulars could have given him.

advice of local experts
original plan had

who

and 48

th

Foot while

Third, the general rejected the

advised him to take a shorter route to Fort Duquesne. The

been finalized

in

London by

who

staff officers

ground and did not understand the density of the
in

th

had not been on the

forests or the difficulties

of river

travel

North America. The military experts who knew of the problems Braddock would

encounter were not British officers, only colonial governors and militia leaders.

The

results

stultifying heat.

of these decisions were long days of short marching because of the

Braddock chose

to split his forces, causing a

when combat was joined. Furthermore, Braddock
intelligence as to the composition of the

composed of units which had not
fight properly.

24

Will's Creek, after the

first

of some sixty miles

suffered from a complete lack of

enemy ahead; he

trained together and

Braddock's army had made

rift

less than

also

who

commanded

force

did not trust one another to

25 miles from

its start

point at

seven days of marching, because the path was small and

choked with vegetation. To allow the

artillery to pass,

pioneers hacked a road out of the

Braddock had received news that the
wilderness but the process was taking too long.
for reinforcements.
French were aware of his expedition and had sent

22

23

hurry.

Ibid., p. 87.

Press, 1977),
Monongahela, (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg
Paul E. Kopperman, Braddock at the

15.
24

He had to

Anderson, Crucible of War,

p.

88-90.
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p.

Making

the decision to

column

in

split his force,

Braddock placed the

ordci to advance as swiftly as possible to citlu

i

depending on whether or not French forces were present

Braddock

9

1

army would follow behind, improving

theii arrival u>

When

tO attack

the rest of

upon

the load and providing support

1755, they

Canadiens and then Indian

allies,

had delayed leaving the

Irench commander had shamed them into action and a war song had

They were

they had planned

not, therefore, in position to

Instead, the

repor ted that the liritish fired

The

Captain de lleaujeu

two forces met

first,

liritish

killing the

was held

in

ambush

the British

to

forces, the

at

the ford

site,

as

It

was

regroup alter the crossing, forming

b;ick

route to their separate objectives

commander of the

had had time

advance guard. Hank security

discipline

The baggage and

it,

They crossed the obstacle without incident because the Irench

largely of

fort until after the

into an

occupy

Braddock* I Ibices folded the Monongahela River on July

composed

been sung

invest the fort or

Duquesne.

were vulnerable
fences,

Hying

regular inland y in a

main body, and

I

rench contingent,

a rear guard.

firm throughout the twenty-two day march and did not

Yet some historians, Fred Anderson included, believe

it

was

this

'

Their

fail at

the end

adherence to discipline
27

that

doomed

the majority of the liritish soldiers to death that day.

What had

not been accomplished

by Braddock were any modifications

to fight against an
troops tactical abilities which would allow them
1

behind cover and

died

in

fir

ed aimed shots

Fifteen of eighteen officers in the

the fust ten minutes of the battle

That was not luck

Koppcrm;in, p 10

M Ibid., p.
27

3149.

Anderson,

(

Yucible

of War, p

enemy

102-3.
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The

to his

that hid

advance gu.nl

Indian warriors

knew

to

aim

at the soldiers

carrying swords.

wearing the

silver gorgets

of the officer

caste, riding horses

Instead of withdrawing to better ground, upon receiving the

and

news of

the advance guard's injuries, Braddock chose to ride forward, bringing the main body of
his troops into the

collided,

ambush

one attempting

site.

This caused even greater confusion

to retreat, the other rushing into the fray.

when

the

two

units

Most eyewitness

accounts have called Braddock's actions heroic, placing the blame for the utter
devastation of two British regiments at the hands of only 200 Indians and Canadien

They

militiamen on the British soldiers for failing to maintain order.
fratricide that occurred

sectors of fire and

when

soldiers fired

upon colonials from the
once

on other platoons
rear guard

was

who began

Actually,

arrogance that caused him to make a rash decision.

He knew

irregulars and a

their colonel

few barbarians were no match

of

that crossed into their

killed.

trees and other cover

cite incidents

it

fighting

from behind

was Braddock's

that

French colonial

for the King's finest.

he could be defeated so he rode forward with every confidence that

It

if

was inconceivable

he stood his

ground, he would carry the day. His soldiers maintained their discipline, though they
often remained in only platoon sized elements, but they did not have

give them orders.

back to the
line

and

river,

And

rather than attempt a flanking

Braddock and

his

The

result

effective loss of two regiments.

Ibid., p. 100.

Koppcrman,

officers left to

maneuver or an orderly withdrawal

remaining officers continued to attempt to form the

volleys into the woods.

fire

many

p. xxii.
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was seventy percent

casualties and the

Edward Braddock was
fight on,

made

support his legacy after the

social status

was

his

courage that allowed him to

institution

at

simply be a siege of a

Navy would

battle.

in

England and

Army

fort.

was

this

His decisions were decidedly predictable, given his
his training as

an officer

Monongahela highlighted a weakness within both

of the British

it

other courageous men, like George Washington, continue to

and upbringing

Yet the Battle

would

It

even after four horses had been shot out from under him, and

personal attribute that

French.

a courageous man.

in the

North American

Not many

battlefields

theater.

would be

in

in the British

Army.

the tactics and the

Not every
open

battle

terrain.

would

The

British

not always be present to keep supply lines open or to close them against the

Time and again from Monongahela until

learn that getting to the battlefield

was

the Battle of Quebec, the British

a battle, and combat in the field

foregone conclusion with victory reserved to he

who had

Army

was not a

the most disciplined troops.

According to John Grenier and Steven Charles Eames, what had developed on the
frontiers

of North America was limited warfare
30

decisive victory.

Instead, raids, ambushes, and attacks of opportunity

wear down opponents or massacre the unwary.
on the

battlefield

that did not attempt the

found small purchase

in this

achievement of

were used

to

British concepts of honor and hierarchy

new

theater.

Frontier,
the Provincial Soldier on the Northern
Steven Charles Eames, Rustic Warriors: Warfare and
...
1689-1748, (University of New Hampshire, 1989).
(Cambridge
1607-1814,
Frontier,
the
on
Making
John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War

30

Cambridge University

Press, 2005).
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CHAPTER TWO
THE PROVINCIAL OFFICER

There

dispute

is little

colonial armies

were quite

among

military historians that the officers in the British and

The

different.

ability

though, has usually been viewed as effective
disappointing in regards to the American.

of the two systems to conduct war,

in the

An

case of the English institution and

illustration

of two typical officers provides

insight into this predominant framework.

Colonel Ephraim Williams Junior,

who

Lake George, 1755, spent almost half of his
frontier

the

Massachusetts. The

is

as a colonial officer

on the western

first

his father to help establish the

document

31

at sea,

town of Stockbridge,

to pinpoint Williams' location prior to

King George's

a survey he conducted in 1742 for land bought by his father. For a while after his

thirtieth birthday,

he was living

32

Oliver Partridge.

It

in

Stockbridge and working as the deputy sheriff under

can be assumed that he was also a

probably as a sentinel, since there
period.

life

of Massachusetts. After what some scholars speculate was a youth spent

young Ephraim joined

War

died at the age of forty in the Battle of

is

member of the

local militia,

no documentation of a commission during

At the outbreak of hostilities between France and England

in

this

1744, however,

Documentary Life, (Pittsfield: Berkshire County
Wyllis E. Wright, Colonel Ephraim Williams: A
Historical Society 1970) p 5
The Williams Family and the Connecticut River
Kevin Sweeney.W Gods and Related Minor Deities:

31

Valley, 1637-1790, (Yale:
12

Sweeney,

p.

UMI,

1986).

p.

372.

373.
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Ephraim's

life

becomes much

clearer with his

commission as a captain

in the provincial

army under the command of Colonel Stoddard. 33
During the early 1740's, Massachusetts and

New York were in dispute over the

boundaries of the two colonies. In defiance of New York's claims, Colonel Stoddard and

Governor William Shirley commissioned the construction of a

Bay Colony's western

line

of four

forts along the

border. Ostensibly to guard against Indian raids, these forts served

the secondary purpose of solidifying Massachusetts' land claims. Initially under the

command of Captain William

"Billy" Williams, Stoddard's nephew, supervision

granted to Ephraim Williams in 1745
expedition to Louisbourg.

when

the previous

commander joined

first

the entire fort line along the

western border of Massachusetts, from 1745 to 1746 and then soldiers

this

until 17 5 2.

the

34

For the next decade, Williams commanded

Massachusetts

was

35

Both Williams'

failure

at

Fort

and success as a commander during

time are important. In the summer of 1746, John Stoddard directed

all

the Williams'

under his command, including not only Ephraim Williams Junior but also Ephraim's
father,

Major Williams and

Hampshire County

his uncle, Captain Billy Williams, to join officers in

in recruiting soldiers for Shirley's

While Ephraim Williams Junior was
process

made more

difficult

by the

planned expedition against Canada.

traveling the county

strains

"drumming up"

recruits, a

of defending the frontier from French and

burned to the ground. Technically
Indian raiders, Fort Massachusetts was attacked and

Wright,

p. 12.

Ibid., p. 13.

Sweeney,

p.

373-4.
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speaking, the fort

was under Williams' command and

his responsibility.

spread fear throughout the frontier and called into question

methods by which
While

this

their safety

was being

the populace the

36

it.

Though he might have

refused to leave his

as ordered or should have placed another competent officer in charge during

his absence, the public scorn

a

destruction

mistake by Stoddard and Williams was serious, the people of the

county tended not to blame Williams for

command

assured.

among

Its

summer of reconstructing

and the entire

was

laid primarily at the feet

the fort in 1747,

Ephraim commanded the

fort line again for another five years

repulsed a raiding party

in

During

that time,

Kevin Sweeney does argue
is

his return

he successfully

that Williams learned

fort in

1

754,

that

though

What

had more to do with kinship and patronage.
at the least

regained his

As Steven Charles Eames

states in his

from the defeat and

reputation through service to the colony.

dissertation

soldiers at the fort

1748 and gained a reputation for diligent management

Wyllis Wright attributes to Williams' return as commander of the

seems clear

Following

of John Stoddard.

on provincial armies of New England, "The

ability to lead,

marked the

in social disgrace
successful, long-serving provincial officer ...incompetency ...resulted
40

and professional oblivion."
over

'

in

1747.

Ibid., p.

374-6.

Ibid., p.

376.

Wright,

p. 35.

7

K

It

Ephraim Williams Junior's military career was

would not end

9

Sweeney, p 504-5.

0

Eames, Rustic Warriors,

until his

death eight years

p. 325.
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later, in

combat.

far

from

During

his

second

stint as

commander of the

fort line

along the western

frontier,

Williams had the opportunity to face the enemy that had previously shamed both him and
his military establishment.

attack

In a letter dated

August

on Fort Massachusetts he successfully

concluded, tensions were

2,

repelled.

1748, Williams described an Indian

Though King George's War had

high on the frontier. Captain Williams had received

still

scouting reports that French and Indian war parties had been sighted between the fort and
their supply center in Deerfield.

with

that

new

supplies, the

enemy

Though Ephraim's

commander
ambush

forces lay in

managed

lieutenants

suspected, due to the disquiet

among

to return safely

his guard dogs,

a short distance outside the enclosure. Their presence

could threaten to isolate the fort and Williams devised a plan to force the enemy to

He told

withdraw.

fifty

men

to ready their

weapons while he and

an attack around the flank of the suspected ambush position. The

man

his lieutenants planned

rest

of his forces would

the cannon and provide cover and armed support but a chain of events on the ground

thwarted his plan.

41

One of the

fort's

guard dogs found an enemy Indian and attacked. The Indian

shot the dog, revealing his position. At the

same

time, without the

knowledge of Captain

fired upon the
Williams, between 12 and 15 colonials had sallied forth from the gate and

enemy

position,

which returned

another thirty-five

Though

men

fire.

Williams quickly assessed the situation and

out of the gate to meet the

successful, Williams

enemy and

force their withdrawal.

was unaware of a secondary ambush, which was

immediately. Williams led his

men back

to the fort under

led

fire,

initiated

conducting a defense from

of the French and Indians.
the fortification that eventually forced the retreat

He was

carried their dead and wounded off the
unable to assess enemy casualties because they

41

Wright,

p.

30-1.
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but his unit sustained only three casualties, two of whom soon died of their

field,

wounds.

42

This engagement
colonials

men

was

is

important for three reasons.

certainly wanting.

First,

Bravado overcame good

the discipline of some

tactical sense for the

12 to 15

that left the fort without orders and placed themselves, and their comrades, in

unnecessary danger. The tactical patience of the commander, however, was evident, as

was

his tactical

men

his

time

in

knowledge. Williams utilized simultaneous planning when he ordered

to prepare for

which

combat while he planned the

to catch the

enemy by

surprise.

attack,

knowing

that he

had limited

His desire to drive the enemy from

their

suspected position illustrates his proper sense that his forces' success and survival hinged

upon

seizing the initiative. Furthermore, his plan to flank the

the terrain.

Second, the colonials were properly trained.

contact with the

enemy and

first

No military

plan survives

position, stood their

men

quickly attacked under

ground during the second

attack,

three casualties. Finally, Williams guessed that the

rates for the

enemy were

Williams certainly had motive to
his

assessment was based on the

fire,

defeated

and withdrew to the

without panic, eventually winning the engagement. They accomplished

While casualty

first

the fighting ability of Williams' unit allowed for flexibility to

adapt to a rapidly changing situation. These

the

enemy was sound, given

enemy had

all this

fort

with only

sustained high casualties.

often exaggerated during this period and

inflate success in order to regain

fact that his

men had

some of his

fired five to six

reputation,

rounds apiece from

rods (38.5
"no greater distance than 15 rods (82 yards) - a great many shots not above 7

Ibid., p. 30-1.
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yards) "

In other words, Williams

was confident

and he expected his rationale to pass muster with

in the

marksmanship of his

his superiors

soldiers

and the public. Taken

together, the account illustrates training and preparedness at the fort that belies an

understanding of the provincials as rag tag and the officers as

Williams remained
in anticipation

in

command of the

frontier forts until 1752.

of another upcoming war and the decline of discipline

Massachusetts, Williams was asked by Governor Shirley to

commander of the

forts

was commissioned by

and then as a colonel

in

first

largely

military

more

were compelled

man

to

to

do with

less to

regiment. Williams

Hudson River

Crown

London

Point

authorities to

Valley. His enlistments

as a

do with Williams' reputation among

his local reputation.

Governor Shirley and other

promote men who could, through

their local reputations,

fill

his

elites

the levies

the proposed units in the provincial armies for each campaign. Williams had

gained just such a reputation over the years
at the frontier forts, despite

prerequisite for

Governor

44

later,

commander.

superiors and

43

years

from western Massachusetts where he had become immensely popular

These successive promotions had

and

Two

at Fort

the governor to raise a regiment in support of the

expedition, an operation planned by both the northern colonies and

came

stupid".

serve again as

command of his own

drive the French off of Lake George and out of the

44

"common and

command

in

which he protected western Massachusetts

one significant setback. As an example of this over-riding

in the colonies,

John Stoddard wrote of Williams

Shirley:

Ibid., p. 31.

George Washington

in a letter to Richard

Henry Lee, August

24

29, 1775

in

1748 to

Capt. Ephraim Williams must be thought the fittest man that is likely to be
obtained. He is accounted a man of courage, has lived at Fort-Massachusetts, and
is well knowing in that country.
It is

generally talked that he maintains good government

amongst us (except Col. Williams)
than he...

that

men would more

&

I

know no man

cheerfully

list

under

45

This suggests that a man's character and reputation that empowered him to provide
voluntary enlistments in his
opposition to Williams,

command was paramount

men

like

who

Pasco Chubb,

in

his

month of delays caused by a

regiment to a rendezvous

at

Albany

England's colonies. In

surrendered Fort William Henry

1696, were either imprisoned or became social pariahs.

After a

New

46

lack of supplies from Boston, Williams led

in July

1755. His unit

fell

under the

Major General William Johnson of New York. The army marched

German

Flats and

New Hampshire

materiel and men, leading the rest of the

New York further north to the
new

fortification.

learned he

It

was

was about

north, through

at the fort to

2500 men from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and

initiative

a

company.

of the Governor-General of New France, Vaudreuil,
Point.

site for

the soon-to-be Fort William Henry, that Johnson

in the

season with three

Carillon
thousand regulars from France and had made his way to Fort

Crown

left

await resupply of both

south shore of Lake George and the proposed

at this site,

to have

regiment

Jean Erdman, the Baron Dieskau, had arrived earlier

fears

command of

on to what would soon be called Fort Edwards. General Johnson

one hundred men of the

in

in

response to the

that English forces

might seize

would seize the
Dieskau decided that rather than defend Ticonderoga, he

position, a few miles below the
and attack Fort Edwards which lay south of his

Wright,

p.

26-7.

Eamcs,

p.

366-7.
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south shore of Lake George. With a select unit of 600 Indians, 680 Canadians and 200

French regulars, Dieskau began

his

march south towards Fort Edwards on September

4,

1755.

When Mohawk
sent

scouts discovered the large French

three days later, Johnson

two separate groups of messengers, one on horseback and four on

small contingent

Johnson Road

at

Fort

Edwards of their danger. Baron Dieskau had

that connected the unfortified

camp

at

soldier

named Adams, was

foot, to

arrived

warn

his

on the

Lake George with Fort Edwards

about the same time the messengers were en route to the

to

trail

fort.

The messenger on

at

horse, a

shot as he rode past while the four foot messengers returned

Lake George, unable to reach the

fort.

At the council of war

that next morning,

Johnson decided to assemble a group of one thousand colonials and two hundred Indians,
led

by Col. Williams and the

Mohawk

chief Hendricks, to march to the relief of what

they believed would be a soon besieged fortification.

Baron Dieskau had made a

new

different decision, however, with the

he had acquired from Johnson's dead messenger. Since the French

intelligence

allied Indians

were

shift his attack north
reluctant to attack a fortified position, Dieskau chose instead to

the unfortified camp, despite the larger

commander moved

number of colonial

lines in front

initiative in the anticipated battle.

column and separated

Hendrick

in the van,

know

of his position. Dieskau needed surprise

if Johnson

to seize the

as
Williams, on the other hand, was moving as quickly

possible to the relief of what he believed

in

The French

slowly, with scouts on his flanks because he did not

had placed any picket

was

troops.

on

was a small contingent under

siege.

His group

leadership of
into three units, the Indians under the

followed by colonials under the direct

26

command of Williams,

with a

rear guard under the

command of Lt.

Rocky Brook, Williams was
from

his starting point

still

on the

Col.

many

Whiting from Connecticut.

When

he reached

miles from Fort Edwards and less than three miles

lake.

At the brook, between West Mountain and French Mountain, Dieskau was
waiting in an ambush.

He had

captured an English deserter early

decided to trap the advancing provincial force

in the ravine.

hook formation, on the high ground overlooking the
Canadians along the leg of the hook and
end of the

trap.

As Williams'

his

Mohawk

French-allied

initiated

fire

Williams himself quickly

Johnson.

rest

at the

called out to

has been assumed by historians that the

killed.

led an assault

fifty

were

The problem

fired

for

to

and

call

spill his

thirty

Dieskau was

that the

up the ravine, but was

killed

of his men. Another one hundred provincials from

Massachusetts regiment and the remaining
while the

in a

prematurely and only a portion of Williams' force was in the

immediately, along with some

his

It

someone

Caughnawaga warriors unwilling

Mohawks, including Chief Hendrick, were

ravine

French grenadiers forming the curve

kin's blood. Regardless, immediately after, shots

ambush had been

arranged his forces

military road, with his Indians and

forces marched into the ravine,

Hedrick, riding at the head of the column.

was made by one of the

He

morning and

in the

Mohawks began

to lay

down

a suppressive

and General
of the one thousand colonials retreated back to the lake

What had become

the rear guard, under the

command of Lt.

Johnson's position
met by three hundred reinforcements from General

Col. Whiting,

at

was

Lake George

back to the camp, which was
and these soldiers fought a withdrawing action

hastily

forces
rear guard action delayed the French
building impromptu breastworks. This

significantly

and

it

reach the English camp. The
took them over an hour and a half to
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French Indian commander
Saint-Pierre,

was

who had

defeated Braddock earlier in the year, Legardeur de

killed in the battle.

At the camp, Johnson

built

breastworks from his boats and placed four cannon to

cover the road upon which the French would

assault.

When Dieskau

arrived, his Indian

forces refused to attack, unnerved by the loss of Saint-Pierre and reluctant to attack a

fortified position

his Indians

defended by their

and Canadians to

fight,

Mohawk kinsmen. The baron,

intent

upon shaming

placed these irregulars in the surrounding

woods and

ordered the French grenadiers to assault. These were some of the finest European
soldiers, resplendent in their

European fashion,

white uniforms with bayonets fixed. Marching forward,

six abreast, they

were cut down mercilessly by grapeshot from the

English cannons. Though the Indians and Canadians fired

in support

from the

the French soldiers were eventually forced to retreat, and Baron Dieskau

and captured

at the

in

tree line,

was wounded

end of the day.

At the same time, approximately 150 men, under the command of Capt. Folsom

from

New Hampshire and Capt.

Edwards,
original

as they

The

fell

upon the

ambush.

It

McGuiness from New York, dispatched from Fort

retreating

was

French soldiers when they returned to the

at this battle that the

men

led

by

of the

majority of the French casualties occurred,

were completely routed and the road between the

burial party of four hundred

site

Lt. Col.

fort

and the lake was cleared.

Seth Pomeroy of Northampton and

including the bodies of Col. Williams
dispatched the next day, found 136 provincial dead,
these men were found scalped and bound
and Seth Pomeroy' s brother, Daniel. Most of

28

to trees.

Unable to take

their captives

with them, the retreating Indians had taken scalps

as trophies during the final fight that previous afternoon.

Much

of what occurred during the Bloody Morning Scout

successful nature of colonial tactics and leadership.

fault

is

Though many

informative to the

historians have found

with Williams' decision not to place flank security out during his march to Fort

Edwards,

his intelligence did not suggest a

Instead, Williams

fort.

47

This

is

saw the need

need for them so close to

his starting point.

for speed at the outset to relieve a very small force at the

not an apology for the colonel, for

commanders were, and

are, often forced

to balance risks in order to accomplish their assigned mission. Force protection

sometimes be sacrificed for audacity. In

this instance, that aggressiveness

unsuccessful but not inappropriate to the situation as Williams understood

problem was that

was

his intelligence

was not

as sound as that given to

may

was
it.

The

real

Baron Dieskau, who

able to retain the initiative and initiate his ambush.

At the ambush, Williams' leadership and that of his subordinate officers saved the

day for the provincials. Williams reacted immediately to secure

enemy on

the high ground.

When this

Whiting, quickly established

encampment and
assault

failed, his

fire lines to

his flank

subordinate commander, Lt. Col.

cover the retreat of the main force back to their

forestalled both a general route of the English and an

by the French on the position

and repel the

at the lake.

overwhelming

Johnson was able to erect a breastwork

The retreating forces arrived to
and emplace cannons for the defense of his position.
bolster the defense and Dieskau

47

was forced

to pause in order to regroup his

Ibid, p. 128-39.
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in the

men

for an

OMftM

in the State of

New York,

1926),

assault

on what had become a

European

tactics that defeated

fortified position.

him

and attacked
his

enemy

at

attack,

was Dieskau's decision

Had he withdrawn,

that day.

of the predominance of his forces to

It

to attack with

given the unwillingness

he could have saved the cream of his troops

another location with the valuable information about the composition of

forces.

Instead, he opted to assault and lost his grenadiers, leaving the rest of

the French soldiers without his leadership

leadership, along with the

when he was

captured.

It

was that flawed

good decision by the Fort Edwards' commander,

Blanchard, to send reinforcements that resulted

in the

Col.

complete route of the French that

day.

This

battle,

along with others to be discussed like the siege

Ticonderoga, will show that the

for

little

at

common understanding of colonial

else than road building and the occupation of fortifications

Louisbourg and

good

forces as rabble

is

really

an

assumption by some historians of an imperial English opinion or a lack of differentiation

between regular warfare and the petite guerre as they were employed
Williams was a middle-class land speculator turned professional
the frontier for a decade before

commanding

his regiment

in this era.

soldier.

He

ability to care for his

number of men

management

military prowess and

men and

for campaigns.

in

at the frontier forts.

guard the settlements meant he could

He was able to

served on

on the Crown Point campaign.

constituents
His promotions were the result of his growing reputation among

Hampshire County of his

Col.

His

enlist a greater

lead well under fire and this ability

was

often
and soldiers with him did the same. They were

not special just to him.

The

officers

too aggressive for their

own

safety and not

all

officers held

30

up well under pressure, but

when

confronted with trained Europeans and Indian warriors, the provincial troops did

not run.

They reacted

to

ambush well and they defeated

31

the best Europe had to offer.

CHAPTER THREE

NEW ENGLAND'S EXPECTATIONS OF LEADERSHIP

The

British officer of the eighteenth century had to

expectations from

social,

many

and military

different quarters.

institutions

Britain had structured her

and from

army from

meet rather demanding

These requirements came from

his superiors, peers,

traditions

Army

and subordinates. Great

which reinforced

evolved from medieval concepts of royal guards and vassal

social divisions

The modern

militia.

started with the Parliamentary armies during the English Civil

produced the Coldstream Guard, the personal force of King Charles
under the
to

command of the John

Churchill,

meet threats from abroad. The

officer

political,

and
British

War which
II,

and expanded

Duke of Marlborough, and Parliament

was an agent of the

in

order

He must come from

king.

words, the British
the aristocracy and promote the social values of the realm. In other

officer

in his

was expected

to

embody

aristocratic ideals

of chivalry,

status,

and private wealth

duty, loyalty,
person and express courage and honor on the battlefield to invoke

and discipline

in his soldiers.

The expectations of the
different.

The

colonial

government of Massachusetts required

ability to raise voluntary

at frontier forts,

colonial officer within his society

its

were markedly
officers to have the

volunteer garrisons
regiments for each campaign season, to lead

which could provide
and to control local militia within communities

the need
war. All of these requirements led to
basically-trained sentinels during times of

for officers respected in their

This respect

came

less

communities for

their military skills

from breeding, though kinship

32

ties

and

their social status.

were important, and more from

their

embodiment of other

member of the middling
community

to

become

ideals.

The

officers

class or better, a

of the colonial military had to be a

man who had worked

a commercial success, either in land surveying and speculating,

gunsmithing, farming, as a merchant, or professional
religious expectations and attend

proven

He

in

He had to conform to

sermon on the appointed days. And he had

had to be trusted to lead his soldiers

men

in battle

men home

made

a large standing army impossible. The coffers of the

government could not afford

on the

frontier,

for the winter.

with not only the mission in mind but

it

and the local communities, consisting primarily

of descendants of expelled English Puritans, would not tolerate
at least

to have

in his charge.

Colonial politics

colonial

elite.

previous campaigns that he could bring most of his

the welfare of the

hard within the

was

it.

Consistent protection,

necessary, however, and so small contingents of garrisoned

soldiers within the four frontier forts had

become

a reality by 1745. These fortifications,

small group of
and the consistent campaigns against the French, spawned a

professionalized officers,

more time

men who

pursued civilian careers for income but

as military officers than not.

Ephraim Williams was one such

who

officer.

served

Though

or as the deputy sheriff of
he worked for periods as a land speculator and surveyor,

Massachusetts
Hampshire County, Williams was the commander of Fort
ten years between

regimental

King George's War and

commander

at the Battle

for

most of the

the French and Indian War; he died as a

of Lake George

in 1755.

Williams' successor as

a
another professional colonial officer with
regimental commander, Seth Pomeroy, was

great deal of experience.
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Pomeroy was
in the

child

mid-seventeenth century. Born

from

his father's

first

of the fortress
that

campaign

frontier

in

second marriage.

He was

living as such in Northampton.

because his

who had

the descendant of blacksmiths

diary entries place

Northampton

He was

emigrated to Massachusetts

1706, Seth

in

was

trained as a blacksmith, earning his

certainly involved within the

him en route

the seventh

to

at

Louisbourg as a major

to

command one of the companies

town

Boston to participate

in the provincial forces.

in

militia

in the

Pomeroy returned from

Joseph Dwight's regiment on the

and then followed Ephraim Williams on the Crown Point campaign as

second-in-command. After Williams' death, Pomeroy was promoted

command of the

regiment, but forced to return

1745 siege

home due

his

to colonel, given

to severe illness.

Though he

did

not fight for the rest of the French and Indian War, Seth Pomeroy rushed from

Northampton
Battle

to

Boston to

of Bunker

New York on

Hill

fight at

and died

in

on the

left

flank of the redoubt

command of the

on Breed's

Massachusetts militia

in Peekskill,

February 17, 1777.

Though he was not

the product of a military academy, nor the son of nobility,

Seth Pomeroy was a soldier and an officer

in colonial service for at least thirty-two

seventy-one years. Ephraim Williams was the same. These

men had

their families
Indeed, they could not have supported themselves or

other

Hill at the

the
means of income. Seth Pomeroy, while becoming one of

of his

other occupations.

if they

did not have

wealthiest

men

in

marriage, not the inheritor of a
Northampton, was the seventh son of his father's second
large estate. Unlike

Williams did not

men from

other colonies, like George Washington,

inherit large estates to support them.

They had

Pomeroy and

risen to

prominence

secured their military reputations in combat.
within their communities as tradesmen and
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All of this

was necessary

for

them

to be successful because without their respectability

they could never have done the one thing their political leaders required of them: raise a

regiment to fight for a campaign.

Correspondence between Governor William Shirley and
throughout the colony highlight

this expectation

John Stoddard, the chief military commander

in

of prospective

his chief military leaders

officers.

Writing to Col.

Hampshire County, Shirley

says.

Sir:
I

have received your

contention

among

letters

the officers

of the 19

employed

and 21

instant.

I

am

sensible that the

for the raising soldiers for the expedition

drawing over those that are upon the point of agreeing
with other officers is a great prejudice to the service, and I should have been glad
to have an effectual remedy applyed to their misconduct in this affair, and as I
have oppertunity I shal let 'em know my disapprobation thereof. .The four
officers you mention viz Lieutenant-Colonel (William) Williams, Major (Seth)
and

their solicitations for

.

Pomeroy, Captain (Ephraim) Williams (Senior) of Stockbridge, and Captain
Ephraim Williams (Junior) will be very agreeable to me, provided they do their
part in raising the men otherwise some inconvenience may ensue; but I would
still hope for a fifth company out of your country; and it may be a few days more
will give some considerable advantage to some of the recruiting officers -

would endeavor that all proper methods be used for making those officers easy
who have inlisted a number of men and yet must be disappointed as to their
having any

command

over 'em...

48

In this letter to Colonel Stoddard, Governor Shirley

his old military adviser

on

several problems.

The

is

attempting to

letter

was

solicit

written in the

the advice of

summer of

1746 when Shirley was trying to gather another expedition to head north against Canada,
this

time to seize Montreal while the British

problem was

that

some

officers

fleet attacked

Quebec. Shirley's main

around the colony had not raised enough troops to form

and those officers were
companies. The soldiers enlisted to serve under specific officers
expecting to

somewhat,

48

Wright,

command

units.

The government was forced

in order to create viable units

to rearrange those terms

with enough men. Furthermore, some officers,

p. 15-6.
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aggressive in their pursuit of a commission for what could be a very profitable campaign,

had been stealing the enlistments of men from other

These soldiers would often desert or claim
assigned in companies with their
Finally, Shirley

officers, to the

dismay of both.

their enlistments void if they did not get

own and under

the

command of their own

had some officers that were very qualified to lead on the

not spent the time to raise their

frontier while the

men

own

officers.

frontier but

had

Others had done so but were needed on the

units.

they had enlisted would be required to march north without them,

a situation objected to by both the officers and their men.

The importance of this correspondence between
military officers reflects the reality that officers

upcoming campaigns and

that their ability to

the colonial governor and his

were expected

do so determined,

position within the ranks. While kinship ties played a role in

as candidates for

Stoddard),

it

was

command

(the Williamses

their reputations

and

to raise soldiers for

were

tied

to

who

in the field.

The

extent, their

Stoddard put forward

by marriage and blood

abilities to recruit that

to John

mattered most. Equally

accepted was the importance of the enlisted soldier's expectations

command him

some

colonial sentinel enlisted for a

in

regard to

who would

campaign season with the

return home. This
expectation of release from service by the winter of that campaign to

meant

that his continued service during a longer

enlist the next

war would

require his willingness to re-

summer.

We do not have to guess how these soldiers felt about their service.
soldiers of this period had a high literacy rate.

experiences and were not reticent

of them. Rufus Putnam,

who

when

it

They often kept

came

Colonial

diaries of their

to their opinions of the officers in charge

promoted to
served as a private soldier from 1758-9, was
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sergeant for the 1760 campaigns

eight soldiers

from the

when

During

area.

his

growing

his time at

status at

home allowed him

Ticonderoga

in 1758,

to enlist

Putnam wrote:

Mr. Collins character undoubtedly Suffered. .we did not complain - however
when an officer is brought to Solicit his soldiers not to complain of him, he must
.

feal

Small

in his

own

Mr. Collins, the lieutenant
the field

in

eyes, as well as

Contemptable

in the

eyes of others.

charge of a reconnaissance Putnam participated

upon contact with some Indians

allied to the French.

When

General

Webb

Fort William Henry with his 4000 troops located

wrote that he and the other colonials saw
soldiers promptly

enlist again.

in

need of a

began to

He had been

50

desert.

By

had fled

This act of cowardice,

coupled with his desertion of his men, was intolerable. Putnam was equally
generals he viewed as cowards.

in,

49

critical

of

refused to support the besieged

down

this refusal as

the road at Fort Edwards,

Putnam

an act of cowardice and many

the end of this campaign,

Putnam vowed never

to

detached from his company because the British regulars were

skilled carpenter to help build roads

and

fortifications.

Putnam was promised

The
(and he took the assignment with the expectation of) extra pay to complete the task.
British officer in charge refused to

home
for

Putnam's enlistment of other Americans

Many

end of the campaign and Putnam returned

Ibid., p.

to serve for

serve following the dismissal of William Shirley.

in

When Lord

1756, the provincial armies of Massachusetts

p. 12-3.

Ibid., p. 14-5.

51

town would Rufus agree

British officers under
other soldiers saved their harshest criticisms for the

Loudoun took charge of the war

Putnam,

in his

51

whom they were forced to

50

at the

sergeant in return
embittered. Only after Colonel Ruggles promised a promotion to

another campaign.

49

pay

27-9,31.
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fell

under nominal

was

command of the

able to convince

Loudoun

taking orders from the British high

bitterly

would not

that soldiers

commanded by

to stay within colonial units

Though

British regulars.

enlist unless

command. The Reverend Daniel Shute complained

about the British conduct during the assault on Fort Ticonderoga

on the breastworks, without

when he

could not even be convened the next day!

many

in

upward of 2000.

regular officers a Council of

52

at Fort

Stephen Cross, of Newbury, Massachusetts, a carpenter stationed
enlisted to build bateaux for the

1

756.

He was

that

Oswego,

campaign against Fort Frontenac on Lake Ontario

present for the capture of the fort and

to France as a prisoner

He

1758

ordered a frontal assault

artillery support, that resulted in casualties

called the attack a "rash attempt" that killed so

War

they were guaranteed

colonial officers, they were unable to avoid

believed that General Abercrombie acted irresponsibly

He

the legislature of Massachusetts

was shipped

first

in

Quebec and then

to

at the fort

of war. Cross had marched up from Boston, arriving

3000
summer, just months before the Marquis de Montcalm arrived with a force of

men

Great Lakes. Fort
to lay siege to the fort and drive the British off the

originally a trading post built

and west were flanked by
Rather than build a

new

on the shores of Lake Ontario, next

hills

fort

known

central fort,

to the

men

which was protected

solely

Fort Ontario and the

hills,

These
by

a

unprotected where

fortifications

rampart on

it

its

were

new

Darnel Shute. D.D.. Chaplain
Daniel Shute, "A Journal of the Rev.
XII (1874). p. 137-8.
Institute, Historical Collections.
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that

Fort

Oswego,

to act as satellites to the

landward

side.

touched the lake and the

»

Its east

fort indefensible.

and abandon Oswego, William Shirley ordered

as Fort Rascal.

Oswego was completely

Wood Creek.

overlooking the blockhouse, leaving the

supporting fortifications be built on both

later

to

Oswego was

The

river.

old fort at

All

m the Expedition lo Canada". Essex

were

fortifications

in disrepair

winter of 1755, the 50

th

and 51

because the British regulars
st

who

occupied the area for the

Regiments of Foot, had barely survived

the winter and into the spring, the main supply route to the forts had

by

and then by French-allied Indian war parties

ice

Bull

was

starvation.

Over

become choked

who had burned down

off

Fort Bull. Fort

the supply center that straddled the Great Carrying Place between the

headwaters of the

Mohawk River and Wood Creek.

finally sent with

300 bateau men he had trained

re-supplied Fort

Oswego

When Montcalm

in June.

arrived,

Lieutenant Colonel Bradstreet was

to fight,

who

drove off the Indians and

53

he decided to invest Fort Ontario

first.

He built

a trench

within a few hundred yards of the east wall, under the cover of a small ridge, and soon

began pounding the wooden palisades to

Oswego and soon twelve

large cannon

dust.

The

British quickly retreated to Fort

were pointed down

Colonel Mercer, the regular British officer in charge of the

back

at Fort

demanded

at the

fort,

blockhouse. Lieutenant

ordered his cannon to

fire

Ontario despite the hopelessness of his situation because his honor
54

it.

our Morning Gun was fired as usual, But A Shot
to be there; we were
Put in it, and pointed to Fort Ontario, Concluding the Enemy
Briched
immediately answered by 12 Shot. Upon which, our Guns were
Severe A Cannonade on Both
all that Coild be Brot to Bear, and as
about
about this time we Discovered
Sides' as Perhaps Ever was, until about 10 o'clock,

On the Appearance

of Day

light

.

force Sufficient
Great Numbers, Crossing the River; and we not in
not safe, any longer, to Keep the
to go up and oppose them, and being Judged
together, in
Men in Fort Raskel, that was evacuated; and we all were Huddled
Manser, about this time was killed
and about the Main Fort, the Comadent, Coll
had the lives of valuable men in
by a Cannon Ball; thus the man who this week

the

Enemy,

in

53

Anderson, Crucible of War,

54

It was

this

136-41, 150-4.

Cross'
Mercer and Montcalm adhered to which caused
concept of professional honor that both
deserve
that the fort fought long enough to
the war. Montcalm did not believe
the deaths
decision winch resulted
and so he had all the men taken prisoner, a
to
they
a lack of fighting, took what spoils
of many by the Indians who, disappointed

loSrment
rekasTbSc

p.

Sg

m

Snd

m

^SS^ment
could

among the prisoners.
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his hands,

and would not extend Mercy to them,

sue for his

own

now

had not time, not even to

55

life.

.

Lieutenant Colonel Mercer was beheaded by that cannon ball and his death put

Lieutenant Colonel John Littlehales in charge,

who

promptly surrendered. Since the

British did not defend their position long enough, in the professional opinion of

Montcalm,

all

soldiers

and civilians were taken prisoner and those

marched up to Canada the next

The

part

that survived the night

56

day.

of Cross' narrative which

is

most

interesting is his

condemnation of

Mercer. Cross was not upset with Mercer's decision to fight the French, despite the odds.

Courage and honorable conduct was expected on

American

soldiers.

by both British and

Cross hated Mercer for something he had done the previous week,

before the French had been discovered.

siege,

the battlefield

On the

Mercer had brought two American

ninth of August, just a

week before the

soldiers to justice in the British tradition.

deserting.
Several soldiers from both Pepperell's and Shirley's regiments had been caught

As was
as an

man from

usual under the British Articles of War, one

death. Five days after they

example and sentenced to

were shot

in front

each regiment was selected

were found

guilty the

that
of their regiments, despite the pleas from the colonial officers
57

Governor Shirley be

notified

and given a chance to grant a reprieve.

earned
refusal to bear challenge to his authority that

colonial troops.

55

American

fce

Collections,

LXXV

Anderson, Crucible of War,

57

Cross, p. 356.

was Mercer's

him the righteous hatred of all the

Entitled Up o
"Journal of Stephen Cross, of Newburypon;
Historical
Shipbuilders in Canada in 1756", E^sexln^tute,

ed.,

of Newburyport
14-42,
(1939), 334-357; LXXVI (1940),

56

It

and flogging
soldiers expected to be punished for deserting,

Stephen Cross, Sarah E. Mulliken,

G*3f

men

p. 154.

40

p. 14-17.

was not uncommon among

colonial outfits (though not to the severity usual in the British

Army), but the death penalty was deemed
officers to lead them, not coerce them,

New England

cruel.

colonials expected their

and few colonial officers wished to

their

tell

neighbor that he had ordered their son's death.
Further proof of this sense of community

found

in their

among

the officers and their

men can be

shared religious practices. The journals and memoirs that survive

Wars mention which Psalm was

recounting colonial experiences in the French and Indian
discussed during sermon and

who

gave

it.

During these times,

officers

and men were

expected to be treated as equal in the eyes of God and to act accordingly. Often, the

Sabbath preacher would be a private and every

Word of God.

Common
Good

Cross, on his

Soldier by the

way up

to Fort

man was

Oswego

wrote,

name of Williamson Preached

A.M. by

service to be attended every Sunday by

all

.

." 58
.

listen

all

the

men

and hear the

.attended Worship

where a

Good Man made many

According to the orderly

by Sergeant Josiah Perry

Scotia, kept

are to be attended daily at 9 o'clock,

".

believe a

I

observations and good admonitions and councills.

book of Fort Cumberland, Nova

expected to

in 1759, "Prayers

in garrison off duty.

the garrison off duty -

1 1

A.M."

59

Divine
This

colonial
congregation of soldiers as equals was so ingrained in the Massachusetts'

mindset that Rufus Putnam, writing about

was moved

58

all

of his war experiences

after the Revolution,

prayed with his
to complain in his memoirs, "Captain Learned

Company

Ibid., p. 337.

Sergeant Josiah Perry",
Josiah Perry, "The Orderly Book of
Register, LIV (1900), 70-76, p. 74.
59

41

New

England Historical and Genealogical

Morning and evening, and on the Sabbath read a Sermon. (Oh! how
changed.)"

the times have

60

This expectation of shared religious observation separated further the colonials

from the British redcoats.

British officers

meeting with the enlisted men,

if they

would never have shared the same

ever attended a sermon at

officers did deign to attend colonial services,

Following the British defeat

at

Ticonderoga

it

in

was

all.

religious

When the British

usually for an expressed purpose.

1758, Lieutenant Colonel Bradstreet

convinced General Abercrombie to allow an expedition of colonials, lead by Brigadier

Stanwix and Bradstreet, to attack Fort Frontenac on Lake Ontario as a remedy for
British honor.

Though

Bradstreet enjoyed the sympathy of his

participation at Louisbourg in 1745 and his relief of Fort

men

Oswego

lost

because of his

in 1756, the colonial

troops were unhappy with Abercrombie and distrustful of Stanwix. They were beginning

to desert

enough

and the colonial officers were

not, in Stanwix' s

mind, enforcing discipline with

vigor. For this reason, the Brigadier decided to bring his entire

regular officers to Sunday sermon, an act that

was cause

compliment of

for noting in the journal of

one

of the regimental chaplains, Daniel Shute.

Sunday Mr. Spencer,

New York Chaplain,

Chron 32 v. Gen Stanwix
them acknowledged their great

preached

1 1

and ye Regular officers present. In his address to
Disingenuity
goodness in coming to N. America with such noble views, and the

of ye people

on

their

in failing to

wonted Lenity

make them

grateful returns.

in discipline, advised

them

to

And

after discanting awhile

more vigorous measures

to

prevent deserting.

The sarcasm of this
were

religious

man

is

hard to miss. Shute and the rest of the colonials

insulted that the British officers

Putnam,
Shute,

would

interrupt their prayers and use the pulpit to

p. 11.

p. 140.
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denounce colonial military
hierarchies; they

action

Sermons were not a forum

practices.

were a forum

for

men

all

to

for reinforcing military

humble themselves before God. Stanwix's

was inexcusable.
Such expectations of leadership, of humility and courage, did not come

from the lower

ranks.

They

also

came from an

and commissioned

soldiers, enlisted

these expectations

alike,

egalitarian society that

were a

Condemnation

part.

came from both below and from

men

as a

memoir composed

which he was commissioned as a

memories

general.

as a private soldier informed

by

in the initial

of

Revolution in

his later experiences as an officer.

officers

Yet the

among themselves

the Battle of Lake George.

regiment. Following

ambush between Lake George and Fort Edward, Pomeroy

led the remnants of the regiment in the defense of the

following General Johnson's retirement with a

smoke had

his attendance

His views, therefore, were a mixture of

Pomeroy was second-in-command of Ephraim Williams'
Williams' death

meet

for failure to

after his service during the

most compelling example of the expectations of colonial

comes from Seth Pomeroy following

Massachusetts'

For example, Rufus Putnam

peers.

wrote the passage quoted above concerning Captain Learned and
service with his

all

solely

wound

cleared, however, Williams' replacement

Though Pomeroy was second

in the chain

encampment under Phineas Lyman
to the buttock.

became a more

Once

among

powder

political question.

of command while Williams was

not the most senior lieutenant colonel present

the

he was

alive,

the Massachusetts' provincial army.

whether to promote from within each
Johnson held a council of war to determine
regiment that had

lost officers or to

promote by seniority and

Lt. Col.

promote by

Thomas

seniority.

The decision was made

Gilbert, of Taunton,

43

was promoted pro

to

tempore to succeed Williams

Johnson had received

until

official orders

from the

governor.

This decision to place the regiment comprised mostly of Hampshire men, under
the

command of an

outsider did not

sit

well with the rank and

file

of the regiment.

According to the editor of Pomeroy's journal, Louis Effingham de Forest, the

men had
officer

petitioned Johnson for the promotion of Pomeroy to

from another regiment, and another county, was sent

Pomeroy wrote

small revolt of their own.

regimental colors)

morning brought
incident

shows

that "

.

.

command.

instead, the

62
'

When

men

&

Set

back

&

Said yt he had rathar they had took his head off

It

that

Pomeroy's

up whare

dislike

it

an

staged a

one night Some Person Took

away

it

enlisted

it

(the

aut to be at Colo Williams Tent Gilbart In ye

of Gilbert did not stem from the

" 63

fact that

This

he was

not from Hampshire County. For Pomeroy, and the other officers in the regiment,
Gilbert's reaction to the prank

to

was

Pomeroy, Gilbert was "Famos
entire honor

placed his

in a flag,

a telling statement of Gilbert's character. According

Insulting", a

man who

"So much upon

his

craved promotion and foolishly

Shame'

64

orders arrived
Within two weeks of Johnson's pro tempore promotions, written
to
from Boston. The acting governor, Spencer Phips, decided to bend

local political

regiments. Petitions had arrived from
pressures and promote the officers from within the

war council
Northampton, complaining against the decision of Johnson's
from without the Hampshire regiment, and perhaps
the governor promoted

62

63

64

Pomeroy,
Ibid

,

p.

Pomeroy

in

at

to

promote

the urgings of Col. Israel Williams

county's
order to retain the continued support of the

p. 117.

121-2.

Ibid., p. 122-3.
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representatives in the General Council.

send Gilbert packing. In
returned home.

Pomeroy

fact,

Gilbert

invited

all

Pomeroy and

was so enraged he

left

the

were

all

campaign

too happy to

entirely

and

the officers in the regiment to his headquarters for a

celebratory drink to toast the end of "Gilbard

Sattisfaction with ye officers".

his soldiers

& Tirony"

much

to the "univertial

65

Instead of accepting the promotion of an officer from outside the regiment, the

colonial soldiers of Massachusetts believed they had the right to decide

succeed their previous commander. And more importantly for
believed

it

as well.

in

He had been

should

this instant, the officers

Seth Pomeroy was almost certainly disappointed not to have been

immediately promoted to colonel by Johnson. After

Louisbourg

who

all,

he had served with distinction

1745 and continued to serve defending the

passed over for Ephraim Williams to

frontier

command

because of Williams' higher reputation and kinship

at

between the two wars.

the regiment initially

ties in the

county but he was second-

neither
in-command. Furthermore, Gilbert only outranked Pomeroy by two days! Yet

Pomeroy' s journal

entries nor any of his letters

of his concern. Rather, he and
decision to place an officer in

his

,

p.

indicate that jealousy

men, officers and enlisted

command who was

placed himself above those in his command.

Ibid

home

124.

45

was

alike, disagreed

the cause

with the

not selected from within and

who

CHAPTER FOUR
LEADERSHIP IN ACTION

For two hundred years, European powers competed with one another over the

cod

of Canada. Competition took various forms from the

fisheries off the eastern coast

piracy of privateers to outright combat between imperial navies.

fleets,

To

support their fishing

France and England each established ports along the Canadian coast and English

Harbor on Cape Breton

Island, or

Havre a

completely freeze over in the winter.

its

Its

1'

Anglais,

was the one harbor that

did not

narrow opening to the sea had a small island

the rest of Acadia

understood that

was ceded

its

position

to the English and

was economically

became Nova

Scotia.

The French

desirable and strategically important to the

to the
protection of her North American possessions because of its proximity

St.

Lawrence River. Therefore,

for a stone fortress to

The
engineers,

Situated

Louisbourg was planned and

Verville and then Verrier, based

among

government of Louis

its

entrance

^T,^"^

XV began to pay

built

upon the

by two French

itself

was

was

large

enough

for

side

66

military

tenets established

rocky coast,
the natural protections of swamps and the

pond. The harbor

mouth of

be built around the town known to the French as Louisbourg.

fortress at

first

in 1720, the

on the harbor
were thick though not continuous; there was a gap

while

in

This port was retained by the French in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, though

center.

the

rich

its

by Vauban.

stone walls

where there was a

French naval vessels to maneuver within

in the mouth of the
protected by the Island Battery constructed

to

a Continent, (Englewood

46

1-10.
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965), p.

A final

channel.

artillery fortification, the

Grand Battery, was

built a

mile to the

northeast to defend the Island Battery or the fort against attack. 67

While the presence of the
stationed at

fort

was of concern

to the English, their fishing vessels

Canseau continued to infringe upon French

French governor

at

Louisbourg

settlement. This attack,

1744 detached

in

combined with the

In retaliation, the

interests.

his soldiers to destroy the English

initiation

of the

War

of the Austrian

Succession in the American colonies, was used by the Massachusetts governor, William
Shirley, to begin a

campaign against the French

men under the command of William
London

Commodore

that the attack

Sir Peter

Meanwhile, Shirley gathered a

When the colonial
position and began to

choked with

ice,

left

was

fort

flotilla

Navy

Shirley convinced his

destroyed the year before.

his

army north

fort,

they re-fortified their

Their scouts discovered that the French harbor was
drill

to

68

for three weeks.

arrived and, after a council of war with Pepperrell,

to blockade

Navy and

Indies with his squadron.

of colonial privateers to transport

forces arrived at the destroyed

drill.

army of 4000

plausible if he had the aid of the British

forcing the provincials to wait and

1745, the British

Warren

Pepperrell from Maine.

Warren was dispatched from the West

Canseau, a former British

of 1745. Shirley

New England colonies to produce a provincial

enlisted the help of the other

patrons in

fort in the spring

On

still

April 13,

Commodore

Cape Breton. Though the French were aware of a renewed

English presence south of Louisbourg, Governor

Du Chambon assumed the force

only

directed reinforcements from Quebec,
capable of rebuilding Canseau. For this reason, he

67

Ibid., p. 23-8.

68

Ibid., p.

56-62.

Grenier, The First

Way of War,

p. 68.

47

command of Lieutenant

under the

Annapolis Royal

Chambon

in the belief that forces at

did not send

word to France

When the English
Money had

Pierre-Paul Marin de

la

Canseau were not a threat.

requesting naval support.

forces arrived on April 23, the

not been forthcoming from the

near mutiny the year before had resulted in

needed.

When

Thierry,

commander of the Grand

Malgue, to march on

Crown
little

for

work conducted where

fortress, landing at

defeating a group of eighty French soldiers.

near the fort over two days.

Grand Battery and assess
their

enough to destroy

French

artillery

Ibid., p.

its

comrades

their

own

The

men

him

to disembark

2000

scouted around the rear of the fortress to locate

disposition.

inside.

The men found the

The French,

fort

abandoned and

realizing that they

had not done

guns, detached a force to re-take the battery.

own

soldiers

who

It

was too

and by the next morning the

bombardment of Louisbourg had begun.

65-72.

75-80.

48

little

repelled the

French
Gunsmiths, led by Major Seth Pomeroy, arrived to repair the

Ibid., p. 73-5.

Ibid., p.

Fresh Water Cove and

victory allowed

Pepperrell, notified in advance, dispatched his

attack.

agreed and

70

Directly after the landing, 13

waved

Du Chambon

without ever firing a shot. With naval support, Pepperrell began an

amphibious assault three miles from the

late.

was most

Battery, determined the position untenable and

left

too

it

the British vessels began their initial bombardment, Captain Chassin de

the guns were

quickly

in disrepair.

needed work on the walls and a

the guns be spiked and the battery abandoned.

the

Du

69

Grand Battery was

recommended

men

In addition,

71

The English

beach. They realized there

from the

walls, a position

deter any

artillery

was high ground overlooking

known

to the French but

enemy from emplacing guns

there.

emplacement there and managed,

navigate the marsh with stone sledges.

second

own

forces then began to unload their

and mortars on to the

the fortress less than a mile

assumed to be swampy enough

to

Pepperrell appreciated the necessity of an

after four

He

artillery

days of continuous hauling, to

placed the guns above the town and began a

72

artillery attack.

For the next two weeks Louisbourg endured shelling from two
the walls sustained severe damage, they did not

enough to allow English mortars

became concerned

to

bomb

fall

Though

and neither position was close

the inside of the

as their stores of ammunition and

unable to defeat or destroy the Island Battery and

positions.

fort.

Pepperrell and

powder were

still

depleted.

Warren

Warren was

could not enter the harbor. Then

the French frigate Vigilant arrived to re-supply the fortress. Warren

managed

to capture

concerns over supplies
her before she could run the blockade and, for a while, English

were abated. The Island Battery

still

remained the key to capturing the French

fortress,

without the close support
however, as an assault on Louisbourg was deemed impossible

of the British naval guns.

73

route, Pepperrell
Spurred on by concerns that more French vessels were en

was conducted under the cover of
planned an assault on the Island Battery. The assault
island without incident.
night with the soldiers landing on the small

indiscipline

prominent
and amateurism of the provincials, a factor so

historians
British contemporaries and modern

72

alike.

Ibid., p. 80-4.

73

Ibid., p.

The problem was

85-88.

49

in the writings

the

of

A drunken soldier let out a war cry

just as they

soldiers

were about

manned

to scale the undefended walls of the battery.

their posts

and repelled the attackers

after a

Alerted, the French

two hour

fight that

ended

with over 180 English casualties. Another method would have to be found to destroy the
Island Battery.

Soon

74

after the failed attack

on the battery

fort,

under the pretense that English

captives had been mistreated, Pepperrell sent an officer to Louisbourg with a letter from

the French officers of the Vigilant, describing their

good treatment. The

British officer

complained against French mistreatment of English captives and awaited
reply.

Unbeknownst

ascertain that

that supplies

Du Chambon's

to the French, this English officer spoke French and he

Du Chambon
would not

arrive sorely tested French morale.

He

destroy Annapolis Royal, was marching on Canseau.
soldiers stationed there and then relieve

rear.

able to

had not known the Vigilant was captured. The realization

A subsequent

capture of a

French vessel from Acadia warned the English that Captain Marin, having

English from their

was

Du Chambon

at

Pepperrell dispatched soldiers

planned to

kill

failed to

the English

Louisbourg by attacking the

on two

colonial privateers

who

the soldiers there, the
arrived at Canseau before Marin. Gathering three other ships and

English surprised Marin's force as
destroyed them in the water.

75

it

The

was crossing

intelligence gained

ships and the subterfuge of colonial officers

Warren and Pepperrell then decided

became
to

artillery pieces

74

Ibid., p. 93-5.

75

Ibid., p. 93-8.

sunk

in

by both the capture of French

pivotal to English success.

move some of their

Lighthouse Point, overlooking the Island Battery.

French

the channel to the English fort and

Some

artillery to the

colonials had discovered ten

English
shallow water in the bay and, combined with

50

mortars, the English built an emplacement less than a mile from the

Soon mortar bombs were lobbed within

battery.

This was the

final

straw for

Du Chambon and the French were

army

Pomeroy

feared

& Destroy' d a grate Part of ym
It

would seem

".

."
.

that this assault

.in all

.

76
,

.

forced to surrender.

on the

fortress

Probibility Prov'd Fatal

To our

to plan their assault

human

the French suddenly surrendered.

was doomed from

the

start.

manned by

professional French soldiers and Swiss mercenaries,

continent.

The attacking force was

largely inexperienced.

trial

attributed to

Du Chambon' s

of the

show that

battle

and

77

The French

was

fortress,

the strongest

on the

provincial (and so rag tag) and the officers that led

Only three weeks were given to

learned their trade through

existing French

the walls, destroying the magazine.

While the English commanders held a council of war
proper, an assault Seth

last

error.

drill

and most of the

artillery

it

men

Although a part of the English success can be

oversights and underestimation of English intent, the details

a greater part of responsibility lay with the English leaders.

the
Despite some historians' claims that Pepperrell's plan was to immediately assault

fortress walls

siege.

78
,

in fact the colonial leadership

Reconnaissance was

that the

critical in

made many sound

determining

Grand Battery was undefended, and

when

to start the attack, discovering

realizing that

against incoming French forces. Artillery placement

decisions during the

Canseau had

was key

to

to the battle and Pepperrell

positions despite the
and his officers were determined to establish those

involved.

Pomeroy,

difficulties

no draft animals had been
Soldiers had to haul the guns themselves because

brought. Certainly, this

76

be defended

was an

oversight in planning but the military leadership

p. 50.

77

Downey,

78

Wilderness,
Chet, Conquering the American

p. 98-102.
p. 102.
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necessary to motivate those soldiers in the
officers

and privates alike pulled

sometimes resulting

was crushed by

in

swamp was

artillery pieces

a broken leg or arm

astounding. For four days,

weighing several tons on stone sledges,

when

a soldier became stuck in the

mud and

the sleds. Yet the officers maintained their determination and their

soldiers did not quit. Furthermore, despite

Commodore Warrens'

pressures in repeated

councils of war, Pepperrell resisted the urge to order a suicidal frontal attack on the walls

of Louisbourg

until all other pieces

were

in place to

allow the greatest chance for success.

General Abercrombie would not be as patient twelve years

There
in

is

no doubt mistakes were made during the campaign. Supplies were slow

coming from Boston, forcing

supplies.

later.

New England

soldiers to rely

on captured French

Clothing and shelter became a problem and disease took

of all was the failed mission to capture the Island Battery by raid
as a whole, however,

month

made

was

siege that required

successful.

many

The

its toll.

at night.

Most

glaring

The campaign

colonials held together as a unit for a two-

separate successes to be accomplished.

The

British

intelligence but
the siege possible through their blockade and with captured

the artillery positions that

won the

it

Navy
was

day, not naval guns. In this instance, at least, the

proven that they could be victorious
colonies of New England, led by Massachusetts, had

on the

battlefield.

by a
Despite this victory in the realm of regular warfare

New England provincial

effective; the battle
army, some historians do not agree that they were

an exception to the

rule.

Particularly,

Conquering the Wilderness,

in

Guy Chet

which he argues

successful militarily occurring in

Louisbourg was

has produced a well researched book,
that there

was nothing new or

New England through the

52

at

particularly

Seven Years' War. Instead,

the colonial armies of Massachusetts and

years from King Philip's

War to

New York

1755 and British intervention was necessary to defeat

France. Chet agrees with Stanley Pargellis,

among

focus must be paid to British forces in the colonies
military institutions

of tactics or

deteriorated over the course of 150

other historians of the period, that

if

one

is

to understand

how

colonial

were formed. In other words, there was no viable "Americanization"

logistics (and therefore leadership) in the

American exceptionalism.

New England

colonies,

no

79

Two other historians have written to

refute this position

Englanders had developed a viable military institution but that
fight the petite guerre or irregular warfare.

historians have presented a

skewed

portrait

Steven Charles

by claiming
it

that

New

was one designed

Eames

to

argues that previous

of northern colonial forces as incompetent

because they focused on major events and tended to favor the contemporary opinions of
the professionals of the era, in other words British officers. According to Eames, colonial

forces

were successful when they used

ambushes designed to

surprise the

guerrilla tactics

enemy and

and conducted raids and

destroy property. This type of limited,

unconventional warfare was necessary to defeat Indian forces and the French

who

French and colonial
favored these tactics as well. Furthermore, when the results of both

major campaigns are compared from 1690 to 1748,

During

this time,

New England,

scale operations. Three

led

New England

fairs quite well.

by the colony of Massachusetts, planned nine

of these were successful, two were

cancelled due to weather or lack of funds.

which one never passed the planning

By

stage,

failures,

large-

and four were

comparison, the French attempted four, of

one was cancelled, and two

failed.

Finally,

through the lens of class. All enlisted
the British officer corps understood warfare
79

Ibid., p. 5-6.

53

soldiers, including their

own, were brutes incapable of reason. Once the

took control of the North American theater
British officers to take control.

were next to
from

in 1755, there

Colonial officers were

was no

little

British

other option but for the

men and

better than their

When

Their actual abilities on the battlefield were irrelevant.

useless.

this perspective,

professional opinion

Army

becomes

suspect.

80

his examination of irregular warfare and ranger units

form of warfare through
frontier

victory that

was

characteristic

Instead, a particularly violent

attrition,

on the

of European

battles in this era.

In the

American colonies,
in this

manner.

form of petite guerre, one which combined unlimited war

evolved that incorporated scalp hunting and ranging to extirpate Indian

81

populations.

Again, previous historians were blind to American successes because they

tended to focus on professional armies and regular warfare. In
the era had experience in irregular tactics.

Among the

fact,

European armies of

French, such tactics were

Grand-Maison,
incorporated into the professional structure under Marshal
treatise

distinct

For Grenier, regular warfare incorporated limited war with decisive

however, there was not the infrastructure or the necessity to wage war

with

seen

Braddock's decisions become obvious and British military

John Grenier also takes the position that colonial forces had developed a

American

so

on the

The

subject.

British

Army had

who wrote

a

a less favorable view of guerrilla tactics,

however. While the methods of the petite guerre were

utilized in Scotland

and Ireland,

necessary against criminal
such tactics were viewed as criminal, used only when
elements. Irregular warfare
reason, irregular forces

80

Eames, Rustic Warriors,

81

Grenier, The First

was

were not

distasteful

and to be avoided when not needed. For

institutionalized in the British

p. 16-29.

Way of War,

p. 1-15.

54

Army

that

prior to the Seven

War and

Years'

colonial units designed to fight in such a

manner were scorned.

the Seven Years' War, however, American rangers were employed
regulars began to understand that they

were required

if the British

when the

were

to

82

During

British

overcome the

hazards of fighting in the North American wilderness.
Grenier focuses upon ranger units to highlight the effectiveness of colonial forces,

both north and south,

in their

of War" was eventually incorporated into the
nineteenth century.

colonial forces

He contends that this

uses of irregular warfare.

Combined with Eames'

institution

US Army

of the

"First

Way

by the

assertions that both regular and irregular

were more successful than previously depicted, Guy Chet's argument

against a peculiar "American" system of combat effectiveness appears untenable. In fact,

the colonial armies of New England were successful for over a century in defeating both

Indian and French forces and a key element of that success was their development of a
coercion.
military leadership that could direct volunteer soldiers without recourse to

Military leadership, tactics, and

weapons

all exist in

relationship to one another.

battlefield. In
Tactics evolve as technology changes the tools used on the

instances, this

War,

happens with a lag time and the

frontal assaults, like Picket's

necessary because that

rifles,

tactic,

Charge

at

result is slaughter.

Gettysburg,

made unsupportable with

American

Civil

doomed many more men than

the advent of mass-produced

been changed to meet the
quick-loading carbines, and improved artillery had not

realities

of military technology. General James Longstreet

is

rumored to have predicted

could affectively utilize the
that only a defensive war, in trenches,
possible by the 1860's. This

82

83

In the

many

Ibid., p.

102-14

Ibid

115-45

,

p.

came

to pass, with even

55

worse

awesome firepower

results, in

Europe from 1914

1918. Finally, with the invention of the tank, and tactical evolutions
feasible offensive tactics of support by fire and

at

Sandhurst,

maneuver allowed Allied forces

to

make

key breakthroughs and force Germany to surrender.
If tactics, then, are a function

tactics? In

World War

of weaponry,

small unit leaders in the

II,

how

is

leadership a function of

US Army

had more autonomy than

ever before because tactics and technology determined that their decisions were

necessary to win the

No

fight.

forces like chess pieces.

longer could generals

Men moved

in

sit

atop the

hill

and move

their

squad and platoon formations, requiring the

leadership of sergeants and lieutenants to clear houses and flank machinegun positions.

In the Philippines in 1945, a reinforced

Ranger company was dispatched to rescue 500

Though

prisoners of war taken by the Japanese after the defeat at Bataan.

commander, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Mucci, was
the planning and execution
84

was

Every Ranger was trained

fire

team

level

was seen

In the British

in

left

to the

company commander, Captain Robert

the position above

Army of the

him because leadership down

eighteenth century, leadership

under

command

fire, that

came

The inaccuracy of muskets

strict hierarchy.

Bess", combined with the ingenious
in close order

overall in charge of the expedition,

Prince.

to the

as essential to success.

draconian discipline and

remain

the battalion

new

tool of the bayonet,

in the

like the

demanded

form of

"Brown

that formations

that
soldiers reload standing despite the carnage, and

to charge, soldiers followed that

when given

the

how would

that picture look if the tools

command

were changed? Soldiers

unflinchingly. Yet

in the

Massachusetts

hatchet
until around 1758. In fact, the
provincial regiments did not carry bayonets

84

Hampton

Sides,

War
Ghost Soldiers: The Epic Account of World

York: Anchor Books, 2002),

p.

120-2.

56

11

's

Greatest Rescue Mission,

was

(New

the melee

enemy

weapon of choice. Bayonet charges were thought

in the

woods and formations were

not to

work well

against an

Though both

difficult to hold in close terrain.

these assertions were tested during the Seven Years' War, in the battles of La Belle

Famille and Busy
fought

in

Run where bayonet

charges did rout Indian forces, usually the enemy

a dispersed manner not conducive to such tactics.

As a

whether French or Indian, did not bring large forces into open
conventional fashion of columns and

along with a change in society

in

files.

rule, the

fields

and

enemy,

fight in the

Tactics were different in North America and,

New England there came a change

in military

leadership.

Leadership

is,

however, more complicated than simply a method for maneuvering

troops given a specific kit of combat technology. The most obvious, and recent,
juxtaposition to illustrate this point would be the Soviet bloc forces and the

the 1980's. Both nations had large land armies that utilized comparable

machineguns and

tanks.

Yet the leadership

styles

different, if comparably suited to the realities

among

US

forces in

rifles,

these forces were quite

of modern warfare. While the

US Army

non-commissioned officer
adjusted to an all-volunteer force, training a professionalized
corps and retaining
Soviet model

its

method of teaching each

was based on

USSR decided to

political hierarchy

soldier the job of the

and the

produce more equipment and

tactics

man above

him, the

of mass formations. The

utilize its large population to

overwhelm

political credentials and soldiers were
an opponent. Officers were selected for then

conscripted.

The

result

often, in indecision

was

a

more

resulted,
centralized form of military leadership that

was
once a platoon leader or company commander
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killed.

What

becomes

clear

the

is

way

in

which the society from within which a

military institution

is

created reflects the methods used by that military to lead soldiers.

This was certainly the case

is

more involved than simply the

basic issue

among

is

whether

armies of New England and though

us

it

worked on the

field

Army won the war through

was Lord Loundoun, with

transportation corps in the North

British success

it

contractual concepts put forward by Fred Anderson, a

of battle

in the eighteenth century.

other "supporters" of the British system, has argued that

Chet, the British

tells

it

in the provincial

his attention to details

tactics

did not. According to

He

superior logistics and transportation.

and

American colonies, which

by 1760. Irregular

it

Chet,

his creation

laid the

were not uncommon

in

of a

foundations for

Europe; they were

simply not utilized by British professional establishment. Instead, partisans and local
mercenaries were used to conduct raids and to gather intelligence. The problem

America was

that the provincial armies

soldiers and ineffective officers

inefficient

and

frustrating.

made

were so bad

at

in

North

those tasks. Their undisciplined

dealing with colonials, for the British, too

The establishment of irregular and

light infantry tactics, suited

that British tactics should
to the colonial theater of war was, therefore, not an admission
85

change

fold.

but a necessity.

The

The weaknesses

in

He

tactics

of the defensive) and he incorporates
soldier or unit

definition, the assault

eighteenth century.

Chet,

Chefs argument about

p.

tactics

it

themselves.

and American units are two-

wrongly defines the
defines the tactics of the offensive too narrowly (and so

For Chet, a

85

provincials could not be trusted to do

is

strategic

only on the offensive

maneuver with

if they are

real offensive tactics

unit stopped, or utilized cover, that unit

126-130, 135-7.
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maneuver.

moving forward. Under this

and the flanking maneuvers are the only

Once a

tactical

was on

of the

the defensive.

His definition of these terms would then place an ambush
defensive,

where the elements of surprise and audacity, 86

more sense

category of the

in the

are critical to success.

to consider a military operation as offensive or defensive in

its

It

makes

characteristics,

planning, and objectives. If the defense embodies the characteristics of preparation,

security, disruption,

massed

effects,

and

flexibility, its

purpose

is

attack under less than favorable conditions in order to re-gain the

to force the

initiative.

enemy

to

In contrast,

the characteristics of the offense (surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity) combine

initiative

with maneuver to either destroy the enemy or seize

the objective that determines the type of operation and in

In either case,

terrain.

many

it is

instances both sides can

be on the attack, though not both on the defense.

The
this is

intent here

is

not to write a presentist history of military doctrine. Rather,

an argument for enduring principles of war that define very concrete characteristics

evident in combat throughout history. In other words, while tactics change, operations

can defined as offensive or defensive utilizing the same definitions that apply today. The
variation in warfare

comes from

the different technologies and tactics

employed

to

accomplish these fundamentals and the leadership utilized to motivate soldiers on the
battlefield.

It is

these characteristics which Chet overlooks in his argument for the

European

dominance and success of the defense

in

and weakens his argument against the

viability

tactics during the eighteenth century

of provincial troops

in the theater

of New England
during this period. Instead, the colonial tactics and leadership

86

Field

Manual 3-90

5

Heavy Brigade Combat Team Combined Arms

Headquarters, Department of the Army,
87

Ibid., p.

88

p. 5-1 to 5-4.

6-3 to 6-6.

Ibid., p. 5-38.
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Battalion,

March 2005

of war

incorporated both the offense and the defense, combined irregular warfare within a more

conventional structure, and evolved a leadership model that provided direction and

motivation to a largely all-volunteer force.

The

imperial forces of both France and England brought with them certain

technological advances and definitely different ideas of how to

wage warfare

America. The influx of professional European armies brought with
regular

war

into a theater in

which

it

in

North

a desire to import

irregular tactics had previously dominated. Primarily,

they imported a need for complex fortifications in the style of Vauban and therefore the

need for

large contingents of artillery and mortars to invest those forts.

War

throughout the Seven Years'
fortresses,

are a series of battles, centered

which required the building of roads and

What

is

seen

on European-style

large logistics trains to support the

attacker's investment. British colonial forces adapted to these changing conditions of

war though the

British

Army

decided not to use them to their capabilities for

political

and

social reasons.

At the Battle of Ticonderoga
British force to date

in 1758,

of 16,000 troops. His second-in-command, Lord Howe, led the

advanced guard north on Lake George,

body of British and

General Abercromby assembled the largest

colonial troops.

in front

of 1000 vessels transporting the main

With him were the ranger companies of Major

command of Colonel Jedediah
Robert Rogers and a Massachusetts regiment under the
Preble.

They landed on the north shore of the

emplaced

there.

Among them was a

Rehoboth, Massachusetts.

Howe. ..It was the

first

skirmish of the

battle.

Lord
Rangers was the first to land. He was joined by
balls and
engagement 1 had ever seen, and the whistling of

his

first

immediately attacking French pickets

sixteen-year-old private, David Perry from

He described the

"Major Rogers, with

lake,

60

roar of musquetry terrified

the trees behind which the

who,

Preble,

I

well remember,

man down who
that

I

killed."

This

a harsh man, swore he

new

still

the rangers

would knock the

first

life

into

and when

came to see the blood run so
me. Lord Howe and a number of other good men were

to be shot

at.

.

I

89

encounter as described by Private Perry

first

came on shore and

British landing.

instinct

put

it

was

should step out of his ranks which greatly surprised me, to think

must stand

freely,

me not a little. At length our regiment formed among
men kept stepping from their ranks for shelter. Col.

is

important for three reasons.

First,

successfully repelled the French pickets sent to disrupt the

Second, the Massachusetts regiment stood up under

of many new recruits to hide behind cover. And

very few British officers respected by the

third,

fire,

despite the

Lord Howe, one of the

New Englanders, was killed

during the

first

volleys of the battle.

Abercromby landed
Lord Howe, decided

his full force

to wait for

soon

after and,

upon discovering the death of

two days before attacking the French

at

Fort Carillon.

During that time, the Marquis de Montcalm, recently arrived from Quebec, began
furiously

fort.

working

his officers

and

to build a breastwork in front of the dilapidated

A trench was dug in front of a wall

defense, for as

much

obstacle, called an abatis,

all

sandbags. In front of this

the trees were cut

The branches were sharpened

down and

like stakes

left

little

that the ruinous condition

overwhelming force would

prevail.

intelligence and, therefore,

of the

fort

no

would hinder French

The rangers and

lying in a

and the entire

formed an engagement area to trap assaulting enemy

Abercromby attacked with

He assumed

made of logs and

as 100 yards or more,

tangle of limbs and stumps.

his

men

forces.

artillery support.

resistance and that

the provincial light infantry

behind the cover provided by
marched forward and took positions on the flanks and
attack performed
abatis defenses as support for the frontal
89

David

Perry.

"The Life of David

Perry".

Th P Magazine of History,

61

by the

regulars.

1928: 137.

p. 9.

Almost

the

immediately, the British formations were

1500 soldiers

in

lost their lives in those trees.

Timothy Bagely's regiment, recounts from

shambles and, for the next eight hours, over

As Archelaus

Fuller, a soldier in Colonel

his position behind a log,

"But before the Reagelers came up the fier began very hot the Regalors hove
down thair pak and fixed their bayarnits came up in order stod and fit very
coragerly our men droed up very ner and was ordered to make a stand the fit
came on very smart it held about eaght ours a sorefiill Sit to behold the Ded men
and wounded Lay on the ground hauing Som of them legs thir arms and other
Lims broken others shot threw the body and very mortly wounded to hear thar
cris

Indeed,

and se

wave

after

thair bodis lay in blod. .."

wave of British regiments were

French without any soldier making the breastwork

fire.

"raised his head a

One of his comrades

itself.

was not

there as well, to support the assault though he

to

flung into the

little

David Perry's regiment was

able to raise his head long enough

above the

log,

in the center of the forehead, and tore his scalp back to the crown

coming of nightfall, the
boats.

Rumors

Battle of Ticonderoga

his artillery to the high

of the battle

him

Finally, with the

first

on the lake headed back to the burnt

.

was

the greatest British defeat of the war, along with

Monongahela. Without doubt, the defeat

move

" 91

ball struck

the French and Indians were in pursuit turned retreat into a rout as

of Fort William Henry

The

and a

British regulars retired and the provincials finally left for the

thousands of British soldiers fought to be the
shell

zone created by the

kill

ground and

in regards to the caliber

lay solely in the decision

by Abercromby not

shell the fort into submission.

of the provincial soldiers

is

that

it

The importance
shows us

colonial

Expedition Against
Fuller of Middleton, Mass., in the
Archelaus Fuller "Journal of Col. Archelaus
Collections, XLVI (1910), p. 214.
Ticonderoga in 1758", Essex Institute Historical

90

,

91

92

Perry, p. 10.

Anderson, Crucible of War,

p.

240-6.
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to

soldiers under

heavy

fire for

provincials, like Rufiis

front of their friends.

in

hours

at a

time

who

did not crumble or

Some

Putnam, volunteered to go forward rather than appear cowards

These soldiers were certainly not

any manner that would have been recognized by

Yet they followed

flee.

their officers

in

drilled into a disciplined force

their British, or French, counterparts.

and noncommissioned officers into a hellish scenario and

did not withdraw until nightfall.

The

doctrinal

weaknesses

in

Chefs

thesis that concern tactics

and focus on

conventional warfare weaken his interpretation of colonial forces, both in the regiments

and

in the ranger

companies. To better judge the effectiveness of the rangers and

regiments, a historian must analyze their purpose, what they were designed to

accomplish. The rangers were organized to

and to bring back

intelligence.

infiltrate, to

They were successful

the French pickets. Furthermore, Grenier's

book

at

destroy property through raids,

Ticonderoga when they defeated

highlights ranger units led by

Ben

the
Church, John Gorham, Robert Rogers and others in their successful campaigns from

western frontier of Massachusetts to

The

Nova

94

Scotia.

provincial regiments were light infantry.

When these units were used

for

during the final assaults at
their intended purposes, such as their supporting role

Ticonderoga, the colonials did not break, they did not

has,

rabble, without honor,

warfare

94

The

bias of British officers

professionals the colonials
however, lasted through the twentieth century. For these

were

93

falter.

(ie.

Putnam,

The

British

men who

Army). Chet

could not emulate the model of eighteenth-century
asserts that partisans in

p. 24.

Grenier, p. 16-35, 66-77.
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Europe

(local fighting units

utilized

by the British Army

deemed

distasteful to professional officers)

in the

European theater to perform

unnecessary before the Seven Years'
model. Instead, what

is

important

is

made

War and

military operations

a professional light infantry

colonial incompetence changed that

that the British

Army had

never attempted to

incorporate partisans into their institution before and their insistence that colonial troops
act like British soldiers often placed these units in situations for

designed.

When the British

did create a regiment for ranging, the 80

due to Thomas Gage's insistence on patronage among
placed back in

command of British

were ever

Ephraim Williams served

professional.

War but

also

in

commanded

Some were

a fort

on the

professionalized in the conventional sense.

many

officers

frontier

all

conflicts.

in the

life.

Seth

Rufus Putnam

Though these men, and many

They did not

They did not earn their

lives,

like

they were not

attend schools such as

livings solely in uniform.

their higher ranks,

on
William Pepperrell, were promoted to higher command based
its

and Rogers' was

most of his adult

between

of their

had experiences of war before attaining

even that example has

failed

campaigns of both King George's War and the Seven

them, fought for their colony and their country

or, later, Sandhurst.

it

definitely life-long soldiers.

rose from private to general in the Revolutionary War.

Woolwich

of Foot,

few men involved

conflicts,

his colony as a military officer for

Pomeroy was not only involved
Years'

his officers

th

95

ranger operations.

Throughout the war, and the previous colonial
provincial armies

which they were not

some,

Though

like

their social status.

Yet

the
extenuating circumstance since there was no one with

lead the expedition to Louisbourg.
required experience in Massachusetts at the time to

95

Grenier,p. 115-45.
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Instead, Pepperrell's impeccable reputation

instill

was deemed

the most important quality to

public confidence in the operation and to encourage voluntary enlistments. 96 For

the large majority of officers, their experience of war over decades gave them the

knowledge
British

to fight and to lead.

Army and from

trial

They learned

and

error.

drill, tactics,

They had

to

and discipline from both the

modify what they were taught by the

professionals of the age to suit their particular social situation.

who were

And

they had soldiers

not strangers to violence.

Barry Levy,

in his

paper "Boston Sports: Masculine Play and the Growth of a

Maritime City, 1640-1790",

how

relates

systems of both Boston and Salem

violence

In the

was sanctioned within

the school

rough and deadly world of eighteenth-century

merchant marines, physical toughness and leadership was necessary to survival

Boys and young men created

their

own

hierarchy based

upon the strong

in

at sea.

which fighting

and hazing was the norm. Gangs existed that fought each other for honor each Pope's

Day with

fists

and clubs and pipes. These Massachusetts communities closed themselves

to strangers and cultivated their

explained

own

leaders through a system of "play" as

97
it.

The reading of journals from
Often the descriptions of battle are
written years after the facts related,

the soldiers in this era might appear surreal to

clinical

and devoid of trauma.

memoirs designed

them and some of the information gathered came from

Eames, Rustic Warriors,

p.

some

Of course, many were

to prove that the soldier in

This
question had served in war and was entitled to a pension.

96

Levy has

is

not the case with

letters written

only days

all

after,

330-1.

1640-1790", Five
the Growth of a Maritime City.
Barry Levy, "Boston Sports: Masculine Play and
Colleges' Seminar, 2006.
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of

letters

meant to inform family members back home

many of these men were
enlisted), they often

quite

that a loved

young (David Perry was only

one had

sixteen

Though

died.

when he

first

bore up well under the strains of combat. Perhaps their upbringing

could explain some of this. That could also help illuminate more reasons
leadership of the provincials in Massachusetts

was based

less

on

class

why

the

and more on

reputation.

The
frontier

no

life-long experiences of war in the colonies, specifically along the western

of New England, accustomed

They came from

different.

first

the

effect

and sometimes

to violence.

not.

The

were

leaders of these forces

same towns and communities. They sometimes served

They learned

as privates and sergeants.

good

men

their trade

through experience, sometimes to

Yet they had managed, prior to 1756, to maintain

their

borders against the French and French-allied Indians and even capture a fortress the likes

of Louisbourg. The introduction of large numbers of imperial forces, both British and
French, fundamentally altered the methods by which war was waged. This climate of

change forced the colonials to
defending more

forts,

alter their tactics

somewhat, by extending enlistments,

and enforcing stronger discipline.

It

also forced the British

kneeling
to change, creating a light infantry regiment that reloaded

behind

trees.

But neither

of leadership. In
their

institution

this area

changed

their

down and

system of officership or

Army

fired

their

from

methods

of military culture, among others, the two communities found

source of
fundamental difference which Fred Anderson has identified as a

separation for another time.

66

CONCLUSION

The nature of military

leadership and tactics has been debated for millennia. Sun

Tzu wrote The Art of War to teach

his student, the

Emperor,

how best to

defeat the

enemies of China. Likewise, Machiavelli attempted to teach the prince of Florence
strategies that

would protect

his land

from the encroachments of the French. Carl von

Clausewitz argued that war should be viewed as an extension of politics while his
contemporary, Henri de Jomini wrote his Art of War to expose the secrets of Napoleon's

while securing his promotion within the Russian Army. This

tactical successes

ongoing dialogue that
throughout history as

is

as important for

it is

what

it

tells

is

an

us about the tactics utilized

for the universal principles these writers propose as the

foundations of their works.
Part of this dialogue in the present and immediate past has concerned the

by a democracy

difficulties faced

recently as his answer to the

inefficient

that

Niall Ferguson wrote Colossus

wages war.

American problem of Iraq. For him, democracies

and so wage war uneconomically. Furthermore, because of their republican

nature wars cannot be drawn out. The electorate will eventually

in taxes

are

and

The answer

lives,

and the

political will to

to this universal

American people

costs,

accomplish the objectives will wither away.

problem within the immediate context

that liberal empire, a system in

is

stability, is necessary.

could convince the American public of this, perhaps a
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to convince the

which American hegemony

recognized but openly promoted to provide world
political elites

grow tired of the

If

total

is

not only

American

war concept

could be utilized to defeat worldwide terrorism. 98 This would mean fighting the Global

War on Terrorism

as if we

were

fighting

World War

II again.

This idea that democratic societies are not well
are

many examples of wars whose outcomes

ability.

Though

this

made

for

war

used to wage war? Soldiers

who have been raised to

who

how

not new. There

turned more on political will than tactical

author tends to agree with Clausewitz, that war

means, what do these debates say about

is

is

politics

democracies function within the

voluntarily enlist in military service,

by another

institutions

men and women

believe that their opinion has national and international

importance through their vote, will be willing to submit to military discipline only so

They

will not enlist for

life.

They

will not submit to draconian punishment.

not accept orders based solely upon the class or status of their superiors.

they will

become very

Such
will

soldiers

assume

seems that

need leadership. While they learn discipline and combat

a society in

their right to

will

inefficient soldiers.

always require direction, motivation, and purpose

come from

It

They

far.

which they expect

do

so,

authority structure based

if they are to

skills,

they

succeed. If they

to rise economically and socially, or at least

they will only volunteer to serve in a military with an

upon

merit, not class.

Though

these factors

all

seem

to be

for success. The
stumbling blocks to an effective military, they are actually the impetus

demands of a democratic

become more involved

Officers
society necessitate innovations in military structure.

in all aspects

of their soldiers' lives and must earn the respect of

become as professional as their officers
those they lead. Noncommissioned officers must
and gain the same reputations for leadership and

loyalty.

Soldiers must be taught the

Penguin Press, 2004). See
's Empire, (New York:
Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price ofAmerica
61-104.
1-33
specifically the introduction and chapter 3, pp.

98

&
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requirements of those above them and be given the opportunity for promotion based on
merit.

Authority becomes decentralized which, while requiring more communication and

risking a certain degree of inefficiency, also promotes initiative at the lowest levels and

allows for quick replacement of those wounded or

The

killed.

provincial armies of Massachusetts exhibited

their history as colonial forces

Their greatest success

came

in

and even into the
1745

system continued to function though

at

many of these

first battles

officers, like

that, their military

had to adapt quite quickly to changes imported by

the great empires through which the conflict of the Seven Years'

Some

throughout

of the American Revolution.

Louisbourg. Yet even after

it

traits

War was

really fought.

Ephraim Williams and Seth Pomeroy, were commissioned because

their standings within their

communities allowed

their ability to recruit.

Others, like

Rufus Putnam, rose to the rank of general by the onset of the Revolution from the lowly
position of private through a lifetime of service.

Soldiers

who

volunteered for campaigns

year after year rose in rank as their reputations and experience grew. The fact that rank
often followed ability to recruit led to the need for officers soldiers would follow.

England was a fragmented democratic

society.

both government and church. Though

this

county or provincial

New

Within the towns, election was the rule

democratic ideal was not so strong

levels, the soldiers within the

at

in

the

New England colonies enlisted often

of enlistment.
under local leaders, those they selected themselves through the act
Outsiders, however, could not expect the

same treatment. Strangers were

distrusted and

election and reputation.
shunned, so the structure of the military also involved

The system of the

citizen soldier

was

effective as well.

It

was

effective

enough

during the Seven Years' War, fewer
defeat the French at Louisbourg. Admittedly,
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tc

opportunities

were presented

for this fact to be proven in a conventional fight while the

British establishment continued to relegate

and

fortification repairs.

more than some
match

specific,

By

most provincials to the tasks of road clearing

1763, British officers

still

viewed colonials as good

for

little

and ethically questionable, irregular fighting and certainly no

for professionals in a conventional battle. For the British officer, a system which,

in the northern colonies, relied

upon renewed enlistments every year and encouraged

loose relationships between officers and enlisted soldiers could never compare well
against professional, standing armies where cultured, educated superiors controlled

disciplined, unthinking subordinates.

would give

lie

Yet the beginnings of the American Revolution

to their assumptions and prejudice.

At the Battle of Bunker

Hill

on

in

June 1775, Massachusetts forces could only

loosely be termed an army. Artemus Ward, a veteran of Ticonderoga,

command of all
more

was given

forces by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts (though probably

the French
for his political connections with the country party than for his actions in

and Indian War) but each regiment fought quite separately. In

command of his

fact, Israel

Putnam,

in

Connecticut regiment, spent most of the battle around Bunker Hill (not

both newly arrived
Breed's Hill were most of the fighting occurred) trying to coordinate
forces and

some semblance of a

reserve. Despite

much confusion that

resulted

from the

coordination by the Provincial
ad hoc formation of troops and a lack oipotitieal

Breed's Hill that repelled the
Congress, Col. William Prescott mounted a defense on
so costly to the British that they
British regulars twice and resulted in a victory

were

arrival of artillery from Fort
eventually forced to abandon Boston, following the

Ticonderoga. With him in the redoubt on the

hill
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was Maj. Gen. Joseph Warren who

refused to take over from Prescott because he had not received his formal commission

from the Congress
William

yet.

Howe directed

He

To begin

fought as a volunteer private.

his light infantry against the

his regulars in a frontal assault of the redoubt

Knowlton of Connecticut and

American

on Breed's

Col. John Stark of New

left

the assault, Maj. Gen.

flank while sending

Captain

Hill.

Thomas

Hampshire were defending the

left

flank behind a fence and stone wall, effectively destroying every British attempt to

overrun their position.
the

hill,

On the third

though they were never able to flank the position, largely because the American

forces ran out of ammunition.

The Americans fought a

with the British out of the earthen

remained
the

attempt, the British regulars gained the redoubt on

in the

American

fort and,

with the support of a company that had

flaming Charlestown and the forces

left flank,

rear guard action hand-to-hand

still

defending the fence and wall on

withdrew across Charlestown Neck to Cambridge."

Though Richard Ketchum,

writing in the early 1970's, characterized the

American force as untested farmers,

100

in reality

many of the

leaders and soldiers had

fought previously in the colonial wars. Seth Pomeroy fought as a private on the

American

left

flank that repelled General

Ebenezer Learned, the former captain
enter Boston after the British

left.

Howe's

who

Though

led his

light infantry

company

and regular forces. Col.

into desertion,

was

99

p.

137-84.

100

Ibid., p.

101

killed or

wounded.

101

American

Of the

casualties

Bunker Hill, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday
Richard M. Ketchum, Decisive Day: The Battle for

1973),

first

the British finally forced the American

the attackers.
withdrawal on their third assault, casualties were staggering for

almost 2300 soldiers involved, 1054 were

the

1H-2.

Ibid., p. 190.

71

& Co.

to

were

also high at around 450, but because of the successful rear action conducted by the

American

left flank,

only 3

1

prisoners were taken, most mortally wounded.

102

Though

the British took Breed's Hill that day, they lost Boston and removed their headquarters to

New

York. The colonial soldiers were told to hold their

aim for the

officers.

last possible

Howe

Though

moment and

lost his entire staff

The

ordered to do so and to

muskets were inaccurate, the order to

the death

toll

among

British officers

was

fire

came

Howe to

at the

Gen.

staggering.

and some of his remaining officers begged
i

and reevaluate the

their

fire until

pullback

no

situation.

results

of the Battle of Bunker

abilities to field forces

Hill

were a combination of New England's

capable on the battlefield (though perhaps not centrally organized

or properly supplied) and continued British prejudice against provincial armies.

According to Bernard Bailyn, Henry Clinton's suggestion to land the British behind
Breed's Hill would have been successful but was ignored by a cautious Howe. Though

is

quite probable that caution

Point, over-confidence

failed to gain the

was

American

was

a major factor in

Howe's

it

decision to land on Morton's

the reason he continually ordered frontal assaults after he

flank.

Furthermore, that over-confidence would have been

warranted had the Americans acted

in the

manner assumed by the

British.

They did

not,

adequate. The
however, and the defense conducted by Prescott was better than

prepared defensive positions,
leadership at the regimental level and below resulted in

high British casualties, especially

102

103

among

the officers, and a protected retreat.

Ibid., p. 181.

Bernard Bailyn, "The Battle of Bunker

Hill", http://www.masshist.orgA)h/essay.html.
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The

British

officers'

assumptions of colonial ineptitude,

in the end, led the British

Army

to a victory

too costly to be repeated.

When he took over the

revolutionary forces in 1775, George Washington

was not

impressed with the caliber of officers and soldiers he found defending Boston. Yet
according to David Hackett Fischer in Washington
chief soon realized that there

was

's

new commander-in-

Crossing, the

merit in their methods and by the Battle of Trenton and

Princeton he was holding councils of war that encouraged autonomy in his regiments in
intelligence-gathering and led to a

new "American Way of War".

statement ignores Grenier's formulation of America's "First
incorporation of irregular tactics and violence;

democratic military leadership found

in

it

1

"4

Of course this

Way of War"

as an

does suggest an integration of

New England with a more European ideal

favored by Washington to produce the Continental Army. Though there have been

many

attempts in the recent historiography of the American past to discredit the idea of
105

exceptionalism, as Fischer
the evidence remains

While

it

is

states, "to

which

make

illustrates the

undesirable to interpret our

nationalism,

it

is

was

also unique.

And

it

David Hackett

own history

What can be argued
its

Fischer, Washington

as

its

society

institution

was

which

the

same

reflected

"exceptional" quality

influence on a national stage in

's

73

.

folly"

,

societies.

was

its

its

its later

as

we make
all

values and so

successes in the

history.

Crossing, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004),

Ibid., p. 379.

.

into a sort of iconographic

New England

367-75.
105

into a record of.

uniqueness of colonial American

produced a military

face of professional scorn and

104

American past

equally egregious to impose our values in such a manner that

our past devoid of all accomplishment.
societies, unique.

the

p.

19-22, 30,
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